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Postracial Discrimination
By
Girardeau A. Spann*

Introduction
In one respect, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as
the first black President of the United States may turn out to be
bad for blacks, and for other racial minorities as well. Some have
suggested that the Obama election indicates that we now live
in a postracial society, where discrimination based on race has
ceased to be a serious problem.1 Others have strenuously contested that claim, arguing that significant racial discrimination
still exists in the United States notwithstanding the election of
President Obama.2 But one thing does seem reasonably clear. The
Obama presidency has served to embolden those who wish to
deny claims of current racial injustice.
Claims of racial injustice can now be challenged simply by arguing that the culture obviously makes it possible for
minorities to compete with whites on a level playing field. Under
this reasoning, racial disparities that continue to inhere in the
allocation of societal benefits and burdens must be caused by
the attributes of individual minority group members themselves,
rather than by any invidious consideration of their race. Although
the argument is by no means a new one, the election of President
Obama now gives that argument more apparent plausibility than
it has had in the past. Indeed, if one were inclined to preserve the
nation’s tradition of privileging white interests over the interests
of racial minorities, it would be strategically sensible to frame
one’s discriminatory impulses in precisely this manner. That way,
the nation’s evolution to its supposed new postracial maturation
could ironically be utilized as an ingenious device for continued
racial oppression.
The essence of this postracial form of discrimination
would entail the transformation of a conventional discrimination
claim asserted by racial minorities into a claim of reverse discrimination asserted by whites. That transformation could be
achieved by stressing the absence of any legally cognizable basis
for providing remedial resources to the original minority claimants, in order to free up those resource for allocation to worthier
whites. The technique would entail more than just the time-honored practice of evading a discrimination claim by blaming the
victims. It would also recast the minority victims as shameless
perpetrators of discrimination, with all of the negative connotations that an indictment of unlawful discrimination conveys.
It turns out that this postracial discrimination strategy is
far from merely hypothetical. Its proponents include a majority
of the current Justices on the United States Supreme Court. The
Roberts Court, despite its relative youth, has already issued a
number of decisions that employ the technique of postracial dis
crimination to elevate the interests of whites over the interests of
racial minorities. The most revealing is its 2009 decision in Ricci
v. DeStefano,3 where a divided Court required the City of New
Haven to utilize the results of a firefighter promotion exam that
benefitted whites, even though the exam had a racially-disparate
impact that adversely affected Latinos and blacks. The majority opinion depicted historically advantaged white firefighters as
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the victims of unlawful discrimination, while depicting historically disadvantaged minority firefighters as the politically powerful perpetrators of invidious discrimination.4 The governing
legal doctrines hardly compelled the Court’s result, or the Court’s
inversion of the customary categories of perpetrator and victim.
In fact, both the statutory meaning of Title VII and the Court’s
own precedents had to be modified so severely that the decision
amounts to an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
In Title VII, Congress outlawed racially disparate
employment practices unless they could be justified by a showing
of job-relatedness, and by the absence of any less discriminatory,
job-related alternative. In so doing, Congress struck a political
balance between its pragmatic interest in protecting settled white
employment expectations and its aspirational interest in dissipating the entrenched advantages that whites continue to have over
racial minorities in the employment market. Although this was
a quintessentially legislative judgment—made by a politically
accountable Congress, operating under a constitutional form of
government that assigns democratic policymaking functions to
its representative branches—the Supreme Court apparently disagrees with the legislative balance that Congress struck.
The Ricci Court not only marginalized the effectiveness of statutory disparate-impact claims, but it also threatened
to declare such claims unconstitutional. And the Ricci decision
does not exist in isolation. When Ricci is considered in conjunction with other Roberts Court decisions concerning voting rights,
racial profiling, English language education, and school resegregation, the Roberts Court’s race cases seem to fit neatly into the
pattern of Supreme Court hostility to racial minority interests
that is becoming the hallmark of postracial discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses the Roberts Court’s recent
Ricci decision, highlighting the Supreme Court voting blocs
that have developed with respect to the issue of race. Part I.A
describes the majority and concurring opinions of the conservative bloc Justices. Part I.B describes the dissenting opinion of the
liberal bloc Justices. Part II describes the doctrinal difficulties
that are entailed in trying to defend the Court’s resolution of the
case. Part II.A explains why the decision does not fit comfortably within the dictates of preexisting title VII doctrine. Part II.B
explains why the decision does not fit comfortably within the
law governing summary judgment. Part III argues that the Ricci
decision constitutes an exercise in postracial discrimination.
Part III.A describes how the Court inverts the categories of per
petrator and victim in a way that ultimately allows it to invert the
categories of discrimination and equality. Part III.B argues that
the Ricci postracial discrimination technique is simply the most
recent in a long line of judicial strategies that the Supreme Court
has historically used to justify the oppression of racial minorities.
The article concludes that the potential effectiveness of genuine antidiscrimination remedies, such as the Title VII remedies
that the Court dilutes Ricci, may be precisely what attracts the
Supreme Court to its practice of postracial discrimination.
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The Ricci Decision

A. The Conservative Bloc

In Ricci v DeStefano,5 the Supreme Court held 5–4
that the City of New Haven was required by the employment
discrimination prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to utilize the results of a written firefighter
promotion exam that the City administered, even though the City
chose to reject those results because of the racially disparate
impact that the exam produced. Whites generally performed better than blacks and Latinos on the exam, and the City feared that
use of the exam would subject the City to potential liability for
violating the disparate-impact prohibition of Title VII. However,
seventeen white firefighters and one Latino firefighter—firefighters who would have been eligible for immediate promotions if
the exam results had been certified—threatened to sue the City.
They claimed that a decision to disregard the exam results would
be racially motivated in a way that would violate the disparatetreatment prohibition of Title VII. The City, therefore, believed
that it was on the horns of a dilemma. Whatever action it took, it
would be subject to a Title VII suit filed by unhappy firefighters.
The City chose not to certify the exam results, and the disap
pointed white and Latino firefighters sued. The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut entered summary
judgment for the City, and a panel of the Second Circuit—whose
members included then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor—summarily
affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The full Second
Circuit denied rehearing en banc, by a vote of 7–6. The Supreme
Court then reversed the lower courts, finding that the City’s
actions violated the disparate-treatment provision of Title VII.
Although the disappointed firefighters also claimed that the City
violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights,
the Supreme Court saw no need to reach the constitutional issue
in light of its statutory disposition of the case.6
The majority opinion detected an internal tension
between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment provisions
of Title VII. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, resolved that tension by giving primacy to the disparate-treatment provision, unless there
was a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that disparatetreatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation.7
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, suggesting that the
disparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself invalid, because
it compelled the consideration of race in a way that violated
the Equal Protection principle of the Constitution.8 Justice
Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, arguing that the City’s stated desire to avoid a Title
VII disparate-impact violation was a mere pretext for the City’s
actual desire “to placate a politically important racial constituency.”9 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, arguing that Title VII permitted disparate treatment as long as there was “good cause” to
believe that such treatment was necessary to avoid a disparateimpact violation, and stating that there was good cause in Ricci
because less discriminatory job-related alternatives were availa
ble.10 It is noteworthy that the Justices in Ricci voted in ways that
are so highly correlated with their votes in other race cases that
the Supreme Court can fairly be said to consist of conservative
and liberal voting blocs on the issue of race.

The five Justices who joined Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Ricci vote so consistently against the minority interests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute a
conservative Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.11
The members of that voting bloc are Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. None of those
five Justices has ever voted in favor of the racial minority claim
at issue in a constitutional affirmative action case, a majorityminority redistricting case, or a racial integration case while sitting on the Supreme Court.12
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1. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci, joined
by the other members of the conservative bloc, held that New
Haven’s decision not to certify the results of its firefighter promotion exam in order to avoid a potential Title VII disparate-impact
violation had the effect of itself constituting a Title VII disparatetreatment violation.13 The opinion began with a detailed recitation of the facts as Justice Kennedy viewed them, because the
majority’s understanding of what it held to be undisputed facts
was important to the majority’s holding that the case could be
resolved on summary judgment.14
According to Justice Kennedy, the New Haven City
Charter required the City to fill vacancies in its classified civil
service jobs through a merit-based system including the use of
written examinations. The City hired an Illinois company to serve
as an outside consultant, whom it asked to design job-related
exams that could be used as part of the process of identifying the
most qualified applicants for promotion to lieutenant and captain.
The consultant designed multiple-choice exams after a lengthy
process that was intended to ensure job-relatedness. That process included an oversampling of minority input in order to guard
against unintentional white bias. The consultant also designed
oral exams containing hypotheticals that were intended to test
for qualities including firefighting, leadership, and management
skills. According to the employment contract between the City
and the firefighters union, the written exams were to account for
60% of an applicant’s total eligibility score, and the oral exams
were to account for the remaining 40%.15
When the written and oral exams were administered
to promotion candidates in December 2003, the written exams
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Although a number of whites, blacks and Latinos had taken the exams, all ten
applicants who scored high enough to be eligible for “immediate
promotion” to lieutenant were white. Of the nine applicants who
scored high enough to be eligible for immediate promotion to
captain, seven were white and two were Latino.16
The City’s legal counsel believed that the results of the
written firefighter promotion exams might constitute a violation
of the disparate-impact provision of Title VII, and that the need
to avoid such a violation might authorize the use of race-conscious remedies for the disparate impact produced by the exams.
The legal counsel communicated those views to the New Haven
Civil Service Board, which was the municipal agency charged
with certifying the results of promotional exams for civil service
positions.17 As a result, the Civil Service Board held a series of
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meetings to determine whether it should certify the exam results
in light of the disparate impact produced by the exams. At these
meetings, some firefighters who took the exams defended the
results. They included the named plaintiff Frank Ricci—a dyslexic firefighter who spent considerable time and money preparing for his written exam. Other firefighters who took the exams
spoke against certifying the results, describing the exam questions as outdated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New
Haven.18
The President of the New Haven firefighters union
asked the Civil Service Board to conduct a validation study to
determine whether the exams were job-related. Representatives
of the International Association of Black Professional Firefighters urged the Board to reject the exam results, arguing that the
exam was “inherently unfair,” that a validation study for the exam
was necessary, and that the exam results could be adjusted to
avoid their racially disparate impact.19 The Illinois consultant
who developed the exams testified that his company possessed
substantial experience developing similar exams in other cities,
that it had taken precautions to ensure that the exams were jobrelated, and that the exams minimized the possibility of any racial
bias.20 Another consultant, who sometimes competed with the
consultant who designed the New Haven exams, testified that he
was a bit surprised by the deg ree of disparate impact exhibited in
the New Haven exams, but noted that whites generally perform
better than minorities on such written exams. The competing
consultant also testified that an alternative selection procedure,
using “assessment centers” rather than written exams, could better gauge a candidate’s reactions to real world firefighting situa
tions. He concluded, however, that the New Haven exam results
could be certified as stemming from a “reasonably good test,”
and that assessment centers might be used in the future.21 A
retired black fire captain, who was a fire program specialist at the
Department of Homeland Security, testified that the exam questions seemed relevant, and noted that whites generally perform
better than minorities on written tests. A Boston College professor of race and culture also testified that whites typically outperform minorities on written tests, and further stated that the New
Haven exams might have been developed in a subtly skewed way
that could have favored white candidates.22
At the Civil Service Board’s final meeting on the issue,
the City’s legal counsel argued that he now believed that federal
law prohibited certification of the exam results because of their
disparate impact, which was greater than the disparate impact
exhibited in the City’s prior exams. He also thought that the
testimony compiled by the Board showed that there were less
discriminatory alternatives to the New Haven exams that had
produced the racially disparate impact. The City’s chief administrator, who spoke on behalf of Mayor DeStefano, also argued
against certification because less discriminatory alternatives
existed. In addition, the City’s human resources director argued
against certification, favoring the use of a less discriminatory
alternative.23 However, other witnesses at this final meeting
favored certification of the results. These included the President
of the New Haven firefighters union, who emphasized the evidence showing that the exams were fair and reasonable. The witnesses favoring certification also included plaintiff Ricci, who
conceded that assessment centers might be a less discriminatory
alternative. However, Ricci emphasized that assessment centers
were not available for the 2003 round of promotions, and that
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assessment center protocols would take several years to develop.
After this series of meetings, the Civil Service Board deadlocked
2–2 on the certification question, meaning that the exam results
were not certified.24
The disappointed firefighter promotion candidates, who
were plaintiffs in the District Court and petitioners in the Supreme
Court, alleged that the City’s refusal to certify the exam results
constituted unlawful discrimination that violated the disparatetreatment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Of the seventeen whites and two Latinos who were eligible for
immediate promotions based on the contested exam results, all
but one Latino sued New Haven officials to challenge the City’s
refusal to certify the exam results. They also alleged a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment, with the City arguing that it had good cause
for any disparate treatment in which it had engaged, because the
City was trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-impact violation.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
entered summary judgment for the City, finding that the desire to
avoid disparate-impact liability did not establish the discriminatory intent necessary for a Title VII disparate-treatment violation,
and that the City’s actions did not violate the Equal Protection
rights of the plaintiffs. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion that adopted the reasoning of the District Court, and denied
rehearing en banc by a vote of 7–6 over two written dissents.
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider what it
viewed as a novel question presented by the interaction between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII.25 The Solicitor General of the United States participated as
amicus curiae, urging affirmance of the lower court decisions.26
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis first addressed the Title
VII statutory claim asserted by the petitioners, which was ultimately resolved in a way that avoided the need to address the
constitutional Equal Protection claim.27 Justice Kennedy noted
that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and that the Title VII
prohibition applies to both intentional “disparate-treatment” discrimination and unintentional “disparate-impact” discrimination.
As originally enacted in 1964, the language of Title VII prohibited only intentional disparate-treatment discrimination, but the
1971 Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power28 interpreted the statute to prohibit unintentional disparate-impact discrimination as well. Under Griggs, an employment practice with
a racially disparate impact constituted a Title VII violation unless
the employer could establish that the practice was sufficiently job
related to constitute a “business necessity.” In Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,29 the Supreme Court further held that even a demonstration of job-related business necessity would not suffice to
avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability if the plaintiff could
establish that a less discriminatory alternative practice would also
serve the employer’s legitimate business needs. The Griggs reading of Title VII was formally codified by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act ofAlthough the firefighter promotion exam results did
establish a prima facie Title VII unintentional disparate-impact
violation, the City’s race-based decision to remedy that prima
facie violation by refusing to certify the exam results would also
constitute a Title VII intentional disparate-treatment violation,
unless the refusal to certify was adequately justified. The District
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Court, and the United States as amicus curiae, believed that the
motive of preventing a disparate-impact violation could not, as a
matter of law, constitute a disparate-treatment violation, but Justice Kennedy concluded that this analysis was wrong because it
applied the wrong legal standard. The fact that the City may have
had a permissible objective in seeking to avoid disparate impact
did not establish that race-based means of achieving that objective were permissible.31
Because Justice Kennedy found the disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII to be in conflict, he
considered possible ways of resolving that conflict while still
advancing the ultimate purpose of Title VII, which was to provide
a workplace “where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”32 He
rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that unintentional disparateimpact discrimination could never justify intentional disparatetreatment discrimination, concluding that both statutory goals
had to be accommodated if possible. He then rejected the petitioner’s argument that disparate treatment should only be permissible if it were first established that a disparate-impact violation
actually existed. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a holding
would undermine the desire of Congress to promote voluntary
compliance with Title VII, by forcing employers to address
ambiguous disparate-impact claims only at their peril.33
Justice Kennedy also rejected the suggestion made by
the respondent City, and by the United States, that intentional
disparate-treatment should be permissible whenever an employer
had a good-faith belief that such disparate treatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation. Justice Kennedy
concluded that this good-faith standard would ignore the “foundational prohibition” of Title VII, which bars employers from taking adverse employment actions “because of…race.”34 It would
“encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate
impact,” in a way that “amounted to a de facto quota system” that
focused unduly on statistics. “Even worse,” such reliance on statistical disparities would permit an employer to pursue a desired
“racial balance” in violation of Title VII’s express disclaimer of
any interpretation “calling for outright racial balancing.”35
Justice Kennedy borrowed what he believed to be the
appropriate compromise standard from prior Supreme Court
affirmative action cases that addressed the tension between the
goals of advancing prospective race neutrality and providing a
remedy for past discrimination. In the affirmative action context,
the Court previously held that the Equal Protection clause prohibits the use of race-based affirmative action remedies unless
there is a “strong basis in evidence” establishing that race-based
remedies are necessary.36 Even though the Title VII statutory
constraints might not be parallel in all respects to the constitutional constraints, Justice Kennedy found that the constitutional
principles still provided helpful guidance in the statutory context.
The “strong basis in evidence” standard gave effect to both the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.
It left ample room for voluntary employer compliance efforts,
while appropriately constraining employer discretion in making
race-based decisions.37
Justice Kennedy viewed the “strong basis in evidence”
standard as consistent with the Title VII prohibition on making
racial adjustments to employment-related test scores, and with
the need to protect the “legitimate expectations” of those who
would be burdened by the abandonment of such test scores solely
because of race-based statistics. He reasoned that, if Title VII
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prohibited adjusting test scores, it also prohibited “the greater
step of discarding the test altogether.”38 The “strong basis in evidence” standard was also consistent with Title VII’s protection of
bona fide promotional examinations.39 Because the Court would
go on to hold that New Haven did not satisfy the “strong basis in
evidence” standard, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly
declined to reach the question of whether the Title VII disparateimpact provision itself would be constitutional in a case where
the standard had been met.40 He did, however, emphasize that
Title VII did not prohibit an employer from intentionally designing a test or employment practice in a way that would provide a
fair opportunity for all individuals to compete regardless of their
race.41
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion went on to hold
that New Haven’s decision not to certify the firefighter promotion exam results violated the disparate-treatment provision
of Title VII. Whatever the City’s subjective motive, the record
made it clear that there was no objectively strong basis in evidence to support a disparate-impact violation.42 Moreover, the
disappointed firefighter petitioners were entitled to summary
judgment, because this lack of a strong basis in evidence was
established by undisputed facts. Even though summary judgment
requires the facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, here there was no “genuine” dispute about the
pertinent facts, because no rational trier of fact looking at the
record as a whole could conclude that there was a strong basis
in evidence to fear that certification of the exam scores would
amount to a disparate-impact violation.43
The exam pass rate for minorities, which was approximately 50% of the pass rate for whites, did establish a prima
facie racially disparate impact that was well below the 80% standard used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to implement the Title VII disparate-impact provision. That was
especially true since no black candidates could have been considered for any of the available promotions if the exam scores were
used. However, that threshold statistical disparity was “far from
a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable
under Title VII had it certified the results.”44 Despite the statistical discrepancy, the City would be liable for a disparate-impact
violation only if its exams were not job related, or if there were
a less discriminatory alternative, and neither condition could be
satisfied under the “strong basis in evidence” standard.45
There was no genuine dispute concerning whether the
exams were job-related and consistent with business necessity,
because the City’s contrary assertions were “blatantly contradicted by the record.”46 The consultant who designed the exams
took great pains to ensure their job-relatedness, and most of the
witnesses who testified before the Civil Service Board found the
exams to be adequate in this regard. Even the competitor consultant, who had some criticisms of the examination design process,
recommended certification after concluding that the exams were
“reasonably good.”.47 The City did not even ask the consultant
for the technical report to which it was entitled, and which could
have explained any of the City’s job-relation concerns.48
There was also no strong basis in evidence for believing that an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative to
the exams might exist. First, although the use of a 30/70 percent
weighting of the written and oral exam scores might have reduced
the racially disparate impact that was produced by the 60/40 percent weighting that was actually used, the 60/40 weighting was
29

the weighting specified in the firefighter union contract with the compel an employer to “intentionally design his hiring practices
City. In addition, there was no evidence that the 60/40 weighting to achieve the same end.” As a result, Justice Scalia concluded
was arbitrary, or that a 30/70 weighting would produce an equally that “[i]ntentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step
valid measure of the proper mix between job knowledge and situ- up the chain.”57 He also stated that it would not matter if Title
ational skills.49 Second, although “banding” exam scores could VII required the “consideration of race on a wholesale, rather
have reduced disparate impact by ranking candidates along fewer than a retail, level,” because the Government “must treat citizens
categories of scores—and thereby producing more ties among as individuals not as simply components of a racial, religious,
candidates—a state court held that such banding violated the sexual or national class.”58 He also stressed that “of course the
City Charter. Moreover, such banding, motivated by a desire to purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions
increase minority promotions, would have violated the Title VII cannot save the statute.”59
prohibition against adjusting test results on the basis of race.50
Justice Scalia thought that it might be theoretically posThird, although the competitor consultant suggested that the use sible to defend a disparate-impact provision as simply an evidenof assessment centers instead of written exams could provide a tiary tool that could be used to “smoke out” intentional disparate
job-related selection method that would have less of a racially treatment.60 However, such a theory could not save the constidisparate impact, there was testimony that assessment centers tutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provision, because
could not have been used for the 2003 promotions. In any case, it did not recognize an affirmative defense for good faith.61
the competitor consultant was primarily interested in marketing Although the majority’s disposition precluded the need to rule
his own services—a strategy that proved successful, because upon the constitutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact proviNew Haven did subsequently hire him as a consultant.51
sion in Ricci, “the war between disparate impact and equal proJustice Kennedy’s opinion concluded by stressing that tection will be waged sooner or later.”62
fear of litigation alone cannot constitute the strong basis in
evidence required to permit intentional race-based disparate 3. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
treatment under Title VII. He characterized the New Haven examJustice Alito’s concurrence stated that it was written to
ination process as a fair and neutral way to determine which firefighters were entitled to promotions based on their qualifications address omissions in the dissent’s recitation of the facts, and to
and experience. The City’s refusal to certify the results of that establish that, even under the dissent’s view of the facts, there
were factual disputes that precluded sumexamination procedure imposed a burden
mary judgment for the City.63 Justice Alito’s
on those who had participated in the testJustice Scalia, alone in his opinion was joined by Justices Scalia and
ing process—a burden that was aggravated
by the City’s reliance on “raw racial statis- concurring opinion, argued Thomas, but not by Chief Justice Roberts
or Justice Kennedy.
tics.” Justice Kennedy went on to state that
that the Court would
Justice Alito believed that an
the Court’s decision should make it clear
eventually have to decide objective and a subjective question had to
that, if the minority firefighters now filed
a disparate-impact suit against the City for whether the disparate-impact be answered in order to determine whether
an employer could avoid Title VII liability
certifying the exam results, the City would
provision of Title VII
for a disparate-treatment claim such as that
be able to avoid Title VII disparate-impact
was itself unconstitutional filed by the disappointed firefighters. The
liability for its actions.52 The majority’s
disposition of the case in favor of the disas a violation of the Equal objective question was whether the stated
reason for the disparate treatment was
appointed firefighters made it unnecessary
Protection principle.
a legitimate reason under Title VII. The
to consider the constitutional Equal Protecsubjective question, which implicated the
tion claims asserted by the petitioners.53
employer’s actual intent, was whether the
stated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.64
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
The stated objective reason for New Haven’s race-based
Justice Scalia, alone in his concurring opinion, argued disparate-treatment in refusing to certify the firefighter promothat the Court would eventually have to decide whether the dis- tion exam results was the legitimate reason of avoiding dispaparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself unconstitutional rate-impact liability. But as the majority held, no reasonable jury
as a violation of the Equal Protection principle. Although he could find that there was a “substantial basis in evidence to find
characterized the question as “not an easy one,” Justice Scalia the tests inadequate.”65 That made any inquiry into actual subjecseemed to embrace the argument that he outlined for finding the tive intent unnecessary.66 However, the dissent argued that the
disparate-impact provision to be unconstitutional.54 Because the proper standard for resolving the objective question should be
federal government cannot discriminate on the basis of race, it whether the evidence provided “good cause” for the City to fear
cannot by statute require public or private employers to discrimi- disparate-impact liability. Nevertheless, even the dissent would
nate on the basis of race.55 However, Title VII’s disparate-impact presumably concede the City’s disparate-treatment liability if
provision requires employers to “place a racial thumb on the the asserted disparate-impact concern were a mere pretext for
scales” in assessing and remedying the statistical outcomes of intentional discrimination. As a result, the entry of summary
their employment policies, and “that type of racial decisionmak- judgment for the City by the lower courts could not be affirmed,
ing is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”56
because there was ample evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
Justice Scalia believed that the Title VII disparate impact to find that the City’s purported disparate-impact concern was
provision did not mandate the use of racial quotas, but that it did
30
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actually a pretext for political placation of an important racial
constituency.67
Justice Alito offered several reasons, including appeasement of an important black political leader in New Haven, for
believing that such political placation was the City’s actual motive.
The record demonstrated that City officials worked behind the
scenes to avoid certification of the exam results, because certification would have antagonized the black political leader whom
Mayor DeStefano did not wish to antagonize. This local black
leader had strong personal and political ties with the seven-term
Mayor that stretched back for more than a decade, and the Mayor
had previously selected the black leader to serve as Chair of the
New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners. While serving in that
capacity, the black leader once created a political flap by stating
that certain new recruits would not be hired because “they just
have too many vowels in their name[s].”68
The City’s political motives did not stop with placation.
The record suggested that members of the Mayor’s staff had tried
to orchestrate the city’s response to the promotion exam controversy in part by silencing the City’s Fire Chief and Assistant Fire
Chief, both of whom favored certifying the exam results. The
record further suggested that the Mayor made up his mind to
oppose certification of the exam results, but wanted to conceal
that fact from the public. In addition, during the Civil Service
Board meetings held to resolve the certification issue, local black
leaders with strong ties to the Mayor’s office tried to exploit racial
tensions by threatening ramifications if the exam results were
certified. They also accused white firefighters of cheating on the
exam, although those accusations turned out to be baseless. In
addition, the City relied heavily on testimony of the competitor
consultant who offered some criticism of the exams, using him
as a conduit for the Mayor’s political views. The city, as a reward
for his assistance, ultimately hired the competitor consultant. The
Mayor decided to overrule the Civil Service Board even if the
Board decided to certify the exam results, and after certification
failed by a 2–2 vote, the Mayor took credit for scuttling the exam
results.
Justice Alito concluded that these facts provided ample
basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the City’s stated
disparate-impact justification was simply pretextual. He noted
that even the United States Solicitor General conceded that the
lower courts did not give adequate consideration to the pretext
possibility.69 Justice Alito emphasized that he was not simply
equating political considerations with unlawful discrimination.
However, he did believe that unlawful discrimination was not a
permissible way to win over a political constituency.70
Even if the Mayor’s decision to overrule any adverse ruling by the Civil Service Board were overlooked, and even if the
Civil Service Board were viewed as having made the final certification decision, the Mayor’s improperly motivated influence
could still taint the Civil Service Board’s decision. Although the
Supreme Court under Title VII never resolved the question of
improper influence on a decisionmaker, the courts of appeals
applied a variety of standards to the question. In Ricci, a reasonable jury could find that those lower court standards were met in
a way that impermissibly tainted the Civil Service Board decision
not to certify the exam results. In any event, it was the politically
predisposed Mayor, and not the Civil Service Board, who had
final decisionmaking authority.71 The petitioners—such as dyslexic Frank Ricci who had to hire someone at his own expense
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to prepare for the exam, and Latino Benjamin Vargas who had to
give up his part time job to prepare for the exam—deserved more
than sympathy. They had a right to evenhanded enforcement of
Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination—a right that
the City’s refusal to certify denied them.72

A. The Liberal Bloc—Justice Ginsburg’s
Dissenting Opinion
The four Justices who joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Ricci vote so consistently in favor of the minority
interests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute
a liberal Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.73 The
members of that voting bloc are Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. With only minor deviations, those four Justices
have almost always voted to uphold the racial minority claims at
issue in constitutional affirmative action cases, majority-minority
redistricting cases, and racial integration cases while sitting on
the Supreme Court.74
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New
Haven did not violate Title VII by seeking to avoid the racially
disparate impact of its firefighter promotion exam. Justice Gins
burg emphasized that New Haven had a long history of racial
discrimination in its fire department, and although blacks and
Latinos made up almost 60 percent of the City’s population,
minorities were still rare in fire department command positions.
She conceded that the white firefighters who scored well on the
promotion exams “understandably attract this Court’s sympathy,”
but “they had no vested right to promotion.” In holding that the
City lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for its decision not to
certify the exam results, the majority pretended that the City was
motivated only by race. However, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that there were multiple flaws in the exams that the City used, and
that other cities used better selection procedures that yielded less
racially skewed outcomes. One could not help but wonder why the
City did not use one of the alternatives that would have produced
less disparate results. Justice Ginsburg stated that the majority
“barely acknowledges the pathmarking decision in Griggs,” and
the centrality that the disparate-impact concept plays in Title VII
enforcement. As a result, she believed that the majority’s decision
in Ricci would not have staying power.75
Justice Ginsburg believed that the majority’s recitation
of the facts omitted important details. Firefighting in general was
associated with a long legacy of racial discrimination, which
Congress recognized in 1972 when it extended Title VII coverage
to state and municipal employment—where racial discrimination
was even more prevalent than in the private sector. Employment
decisions often abandoned merit in favor of nepotism or political patronage, thereby entrenching preexisting racial hierarchies.
New Haven illustrated the problem. In the early 1970s, minorities
comprised 30% of the population, but only 3.6% of the City’s five
hundred and two firefighters. Moreover, only one of the Department’s one hundred and seven officers was a minority firefighter.
It took a lawsuit and subsequent settlement before conditions in
the New Haven fire department improved. However, by the time
of the 2003 promotions at issue in Ricci, minorities still remained
badly underrepresented in the senior officer ranks—where only
one of the City’s twenty one fire captains was black.76
The City’s promotion exams produced the stark racial
disparities that were at issue in Ricci, where minority candidates
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passed at about half the rate of blacks. In making its 2003 round
of promotions, New Haven adhered to the testing regime outlined
in the firefighters union contract that it had used for two decades,
without closely considering what sort of practical examination
would best measure fitness for promotion. Accordingly, when the
City asked its consultant to design promotion exams, the consultant was told to adhere to a 60% written component and a 40%
oral component, without ever considering other alternative selection regimes. Because those 50% racial disparities fell well below
the 80% standard that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission used for Title VII enforcement, City officials were concerned about the danger of incurring Title VII disparate-impact
liability. As a result, the New Haven Civil Service Board held a
series of public meetings designed to assess job-relatedness and
the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives.77
At those meetings, some participants favored certifying
the exam results, and some objected to certification. The evidence
presented in favor of certification stressed the close relationship
between the exams and the assigned study materials, as well as
the considerable time and expense that many applicants invested
in preparing for the exams. The evidence against certification
included questions about the germaneness of the exam to New
Haven practices and procedures, as well as racially-correlated
unequal access to study materials that was traceable to the fact
that white applicants had relatives in the fire service from whom
they could obtain materials and assistance.78
Other evidence showed that the nearby City of Bridgeport previously used selection procedures similar to the procedures used by New Haven, but reduced the racially-disparate
impact of its selection process when it changed the relative
weighting of its written and oral exams. The new weighting
gave primary weight to the oral exam, which could better test
responses to real-life scenarios. A competitor consultant stated
that behavioral responses to hypothetical situations presented in
“assessment centers” could test for pertinent skills—with less
of a disparate impact—in a way that was more valid than mere
written multiple choice exams. A Boston College professor of
counseling psychology also noted that testing procedures such as
those used by New Haven could have certain built-in biases that
gave an advantage to white applicants. When the Civil Service
Board’s 2–2 vote ultimately precluded certification of the exam
results, the two Board members who voted against certification
stated that they did so because the evidence presented at the public meetings convinced them that the exams were flawed, and that
there were better alternatives.79
Justice Ginsburg noted that the disappointed firefighters
who sued the City for failing to certify the exam results alleged
that the City’s defense of trying to avoid a Title VII disparateimpact violation was a mere pretext. However, when the District
Court entered summary judgment for the City, it merely followed
Second Circuit precedent in holding that the intent to remedy
disparate impact did not constitute intent to discriminate against
nonminority applicants. The District Court also rejected the pretext argument, finding that the exam results were sufficiently
skewed to make out a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination, and that the City should not be forced to use racially
skewed exam results that were presumptively invalid. Although
the City was conscious of race, the District Court held that such
race consciousness did not amount to racially disparate treatment.
The City’s actions were race neutral in the sense that the exam
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results were discarded for all races, and the City’s actions were
not analogous to a racial quota because everyone was treated uniformly without any individual preference. 80
Justice Ginsburg observed that when Title VII took effect
in 1965, it did not create genuine equal opportunity, because subtle and sometimes unconscious forms of discrimination simply
replaced formerly undisguised discrimination. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court’s 1971 unanimous decision in Griggs responded
by holding that Title VII embodied a congressional intent to prohibit discrimination through unintentional disparate impact—as
well as through intentional disparate treatment—by focusing on
the consequences rather than the form of an employer’s actions.
The Court’s 1975 unanimous decision in Albemarle Paper then
held that even a showing of job-related business necessity could
not defeat a disparate-impact claim if the plaintiff could show the
existence of an alternative job-related employment practice that
had less of a racially disparate impact. Lower courts then began
to enforce the Title VII disparate-impact provision in ways that
invalidated employment practices, such as the firefighter promotion exams at issue in Ricci, by carefully scrutinizing employer
claims of business necessity. However, in its 1989 Wards Cove
decision, the Supreme Court began moving in a different direction. A bare majority of the Court adopted a new standard of
proof for business necessity in Title VII disparate-impact cases
that was more deferential to employers and less protective of
employees seeking to avoid discrimination. Congress responded
to Wards Cove, and other Supreme Court decisions that cut back
on civil rights enforcement, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which formally codified the disparate-impact reading of
Title VII that was adopted in Griggs.81
Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of manufacturing
a tension between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII that simply did not exist. No previous
Supreme Court decisions—including the now-discredited decision in Wards Cove—ever detected such a tension, and both
provisions sought to promote the same objective of ending workplace discrimination by promoting genuine equal opportunity.
Although the task of the Court should be to harmonize statutory
provisions, the majority set the two provisions at odds with each
other by characterizing actions taken to avoid disparate-impact
liability as actions taken “because of race.” By codifying Griggs
and Albemarle Paper, Cong ress adopted a statutory design under
which efforts to comply with the law by giving employees an
equal opportunity to compete could not constitute a disparatetreatment violation—subject to one condition. The employer
taking a race-conscious remedial action must have “good cause”
to believe that the racially disparate employment practice being
remedied would not withstand scrutiny as a business necessity.
Under the facts of Ricci, Justice Ginsburg thought that it was
hard to see the “business necessity” for the particular exams and
60/40 percent exam weightings that the majority required the
City to use.82
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission interpretive guidelines, which were
entitled to judicial deference, would not turn efforts to avoid
disparate-impact liability into violations of the very statute with
which those efforts were designed to comply. She emphasized
that the Supreme Court’s own gender discrimination precedent
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency held that voluntary affirmative action programs for women did not violate the Title VII
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disparate-treatment provision. Although Ricci was not an affirmative action case, the New Haven effort to avoid actual discrimination would certainly be likewise immune from Title VII
disparate-treatment liability.83
Justice Ginsburg thought that the “strong basis in evidence” standard that the majority invoked to resolve the statutory tension it invented was too enigmatic. The standard was
drawn from “inapposite equal protection precedents,” and was
not elaborated upon. Equal Protection precedents were inapposite because—unlike Title VII—the Equal Protection Clause was
interpreted by Personnel Administrator v. Feeney and Washington
v. Davis as not having a disparate-impact component.84 Prior to
Ricci, the Supreme Court never questioned the constitutionality
of Title VII’s disparate-impact provision, because that provision
“calls for a ‘race-neutral means to increase minority…participation’—something this Court’s equal protection precedents also
encourage.”85 “[O]nly a very uncompromising court would issue
such a decision.”86 Justice Ginsburg also thought that the cases
on which the majority relied most heavily were particularly inapt,
because they involved absolute racial preferences. In contrast,
an employer’s effort to avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability
involved no racial preference at all, but rather, involved an effort
to rely on job-related qualifications that do not screen out candidates of any race. Even Title VII race- and gender-conscious
affirmative action cases used a reasonableness standard, rather
than the majority’s new “strong basis in evidence” standard.87
Although a dominant theme of Title VII has been to
encourage voluntary employer compliance, Justice Ginsburg
believed that the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard
made voluntary compliance hazardous. Ricci illustrated that discarding a dubious selection process would subject an employer to
costly disparate-treatment litigation, in which the outcome would
be very uncertain. Moreover, under the majority’s standard,
the showing that an employer would have to make in order to
avoid disparate-treatment liability was virtually the same as the
showing that would be required to establish an actual disparateimpact violation—thereby undermining an employer’s incentive
to engage in voluntary Title VII compliance efforts. Even those
Equal Protection affirmative action cases from which the majority borrowed its “strong basis in evidence” standard did not apply
that standard as harshly as the majority did in Ricci. Those cases
never suggested that anything more than a prima facie case of
prior discrimination would be required to permit the use of raceconscious affirmative action remedies.88
Justice Ginsburg found that the majority’s desire to protect the “legitimate expectations” of the disappointed firefighters
who scored well on the promotion exams was circular, and she
proposed her own “good cause” standard. If, as the City feared,
the exam failed to constitute the least discriminatory means of
testing for pertinent promotion qualities, the disappointed fire
fighters could have no legitimate expectation of profiting from
the results of the exams. That was especially true in Ricci,
because the prime objective of Title VII was to prevent exclusionary practices from freezing the status quo. In addition, Justice Ginsburg viewed as unfounded the majority’s suggestion that
the “strong basis in evidence” standard was necessary to avoid
de facto quotas that were intended to promote an employer’s
desired racial balance. Justice Ginsburg believed that her proposed “good cause” standard would guard against racial balance
quotas by ensuring the presence of a credible disparate impact
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claim. Justice Ginsburg also failed to understand why the majority departed from customary practice by refusing to remand the
Ricci case for District Court application of the new standard that
the majority announced. The failure to remand also deprived
the City of an opportunity to invoke the statutorily recognized
defense of good faith compliance with the interpretive guidelines
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.89
Justice Ginsburg outlined several factors showing that
the City satisfied her “good cause” standard for assessing voluntary efforts to avoid disparate-impact liability. All agree that the
New Haven promotion exams had a sufficiently striking disparate impact to establish a prima facie case of Title VII liability.
Moreover, the nature of the exams that established this disparate
impact was suspect, because the City gave no consideration to
anything other than its customary 60/40 percent weighting—
even though that weighting produced racially disparate results
in the past. Reliance on written exams to assess practical skills is
a questionable practice, because such exams do not necessarily
identify leadership abilities. In fact, skepticism about the utility
of such written exams has been expressed not only by experts
who testified at the New Haven Civil Service Board meetings,
but by other published experts, by courts, and by the Title VII
administrative guidelines as well. Mere pencil-and-paper knowledge of the history and vocabulary of baseball would not qualify
one to play for the Boston Red Sox.90
Accordingly, it is not surprising that most municipal
employers do not evaluate their promotion candidates through
written tests or by giving tests the same weight as New Haven
did. Two-thirds of the municipalities included in a 1996 study
used assessment center simulations rather than written exams
to evaluate candidates, and the popularity of assessment centers
seems to be increasing over time. Among the municipalities that
continue to use written exams, the median weight assigned to
those exams is 30%—half the weight that New Haven assigned
to its written exams. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the prevalence of the assessment-center and modified-weighting
alternatives would have made it difficult for New Haven to argue
that its selection process was a business necessity. The majority rejected these alternatives, asserting that assessment centers
were unavailable in 2003, and that Title VII prohibited the racial
adjustment of test scores. However, the only evidence in the
record that supported the unavailability of assessment centers in
2003 was an offhand remark made by Frank Ricci—one of the
disappointed firefighters—which was belied by the widespread
use of assessment centers at the time in other municipalities. And
changing the weight of the written and oral exams would not
constitute a prohibited racial alteration of test scores, but would
rather constitute the substitution of a new selection procedure.
Justice Ginsburg thought that the majority’s dismissal of any substantial risk of disparate impact liability was reminiscent of the
deferential standard accorded employers under Wards Cove, but
Wards Cove was overruled by Cong ress in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991—precisely because it was too protective of employers.91
Justice Ginsburg also found the New Haven exams
questionable because the City precluded its consultant from getting expert feedback on potential questions from anyone in the
New Haven fire department. The restriction was intended to protect the security of the exam questions, but this “very critical”
defect resulted in exam questions that were sometimes confusing, irrelevant, spotty in their coverage, and potentially biased
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in favor of nonminority firefighters. In addition, the exams had
technical defects that undermined the validity of the exam score
cutoffs, and the ensuing candidate rankings. Although the majority criticized the City for not requesting a technical report to allay
its concerns about job relatedness, the technical report would
merely have summarized evidence that was produced at the Civil
Service Board meetings, and would not have established the
reliability of the exam as an assessment tool. The many defects
contained in the exams created at least a triable issue of fact that
precluded summary judgment against the City, even under the
majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard.92
In response to Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would not have opposed a remand
to resolve the factual disputes revealed in the record, but the
majority insisted on disposing of the case by summary judgment.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion argued that the City’s asserted
fear of disparate-impact liability was merely a pretext for the
desire of certain officials in the mayor’s office to placate a politi
cally powerful racial constituency, and that there was a sufficient
factual dispute about this to vacate the lower court rulings of
summary judgment for the City. Justice Ginsburg also noted that
the facts on which Justice Alito drew to support his pretext claim
were drawn from the self-serving statement of facts submitted
by the petitioners. Moreover, many of those allegations were
either misleading or entirely devoid of support in the record. The
important point, however, was that the Civil Service Board—not
the Mayor’s office—made the ultimate decision not to certify the
exam results, and there was no evidence of political partisanship
on the part of Civil Service Board members. In addition, the New
Haven political forces favoring certification of the exam results
attempted to exert just as much pressure on the Civil Service
Board as did the political forces opposing certification.93
Justice Ginsburg went on to question the relevance of
Justice Alito’s pretext argument, because political considerations
alone could not be equated with unlawful discrimination. Politicians commonly respond to racial considerations without engaging in racial discrimination. There is no reason to believe that the
Mayor’s office wished to exclude white firefighters from promotions, since white firefighters would also be promoted under a
nondiscriminatory selection procedure. The District Court found
that the presence of political considerations did not negate the
City’s genuine desire to avoid disparate-impact liability, and it
found a total absence of discriminatory animus toward the petitioners. Those findings were “entirely consistent with the record.”
Moreover, as established by the Court’s recent post-9/11 racial
profiling decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a desire to please political
constituents is not inconsistent with a desire to avoid unlawful
discrimination. 94
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority forced the
City of New Haven to use a flawed promotion exam that would
produce racially disparate results without identifying the bestqualified candidates for promotion. The majority decision broke
the promise of Griggs by denying equal opportunity through use
of a test that was “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”95

Doctrinal Strain
The outcome in Ricci did not flow naturally from preexisting Title VII doctrine. Rather, Justice Kennedy’s majority
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opinion constructed a previously undetected tension between the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII,
and then resolved that tension in a way that strained against the
overall antidiscrimination objective that Title VII was enacted
to advance. In addition, Justice Kennedy announced the Court’s
modification of pre-existing Title VII doctrine in the process of
granting summary judgment for the disappointed firefighter petitioners, even though significant factual disputes almost certainly
made summary judgment for the petitioners improper. It appears
that Justice Kennedy did both of these things knowingly, in order
to convey the strength of the Court’s commitment to a new postracial conception of employment discrimination law.
Title VIJustice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci
adopted a novel reading of Title VII that rebalanced the competing interests between whites and racial minorities that are at stake
in the allocation of limited societal resources. Moreover, it rebalanced those interests in a way that undermined the initial balance
struck by Cong ress in enacting and amending Title VII. The opinion also failed to apply the standing limitations that the Supreme
Court has in the past used to defeat minority claims of racial
discrimination. In so doing, the Court yet again illustrated a willingness to relax standing requirements for reverse discrimination
claims asserted by whites that are strenuously enforced in cases
asserting traditional discrimination against racial minorities.

1. Zero Sum Balance
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that Ricci
was a case of first impression concerning the divergence between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII.96 But Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pointed out that no such conflict existed, because both provisions of Title VII were designed
to advance the same goal—the elimination of employment practices that had commonly produced workplace discrimination in
the past.97
In one sense, Justice Ginsburg was certainly correct.
There was no conflict under pre-existing law, because pre-existing law held that the consideration of race for the sincere purpose
of avoiding disparate impact discrimination did not constitute the
type of racial consideration that could amount to a Title VII disparate-treatment violation. That is what the District Court held
when it followed Second Circuit precedent; that is what the Second Circuit panel held when it summarily affirmed the District
Court in its brief per curiam opinion; that is what the full Second
Circuit held when it denied rehearing en banc; that is what the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission established when
it adopted its Title VII interpretive guidelines; and that is what
the Supreme Court itself established in an analogous gender
discrimination case holding that the consideration of gender to
prevent disparate impact did not amount to a Title VII disparatetreatment violation.98
But Justice Kennedy also had a point. Even though
Title VII law was settled at the time of the Ricci decision, there
had long been undercurrents of discontent with that settlement.
Individual conservative-bloc Justices in prior Title VII cases
expressed the view that racial affirmative action could not be
used to benefit minorities who were not themselves actual victims
of particularized discrimination, because such affirmative action
imposed too great a burden on adversely affected whites.99 As
Justice Kennedy stressed in his Ricci opinion, several Supreme
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Court constitutional decisions struggled with the issue of when
the Equal Protection Clause permitted affirmative action programs to benefit minorities at the expense of so-called innocent
whites.100 Accordingly, what Justice Kennedy was really doing
in Ricci when he detected and resolved a novel tension between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII was changing the balance that the Supreme Court previously
struck between the zero-sum interests of whites and racial minorities in discrimination cases.101
In any alleged race discrimination or affirmative action
case, a contested societal resource—such as the right to a firefighter promotion—has to be allocated to either a white person or
to a racial minority. In order to make that allocation, some way
has to be found to balance the competing interests underlying
the white and minority claims of entitlement to that resource.
Previously, the balance was struck so that close cases would be
resolved in favor of racial minorities, in order to compensate for
past discrimination or to promote prospective diversity. Ricci,
however, re-struck the balance so that close cases would now be
resolved in favor of whites. It did this by increasing, to a “strong
basis in evidence,” the standard of proof that had to be met before
a resource could be given to a racial minority.102
In other words, the five-Justice Ricci majority re-struck
the balance between white and minority interests in Title VII
cases, so that the new balance would mirror the balance that the
Supreme Court previously struck in its constitutional affirmative
action cases. That might initially appear to create a desirable doctrinal symmetry, but there is an important asymmetry that exists
between Title VII and constitutional cases. In Title VII cases the
appropriate balance is supposed to be struck by Congress—not
by the Supreme Court. It is true that statutes are often ambiguous, and the exercise of loosely constrained judicial discretion
is often required for the Supreme Court to announce statutory
meaning. But that is not the case with the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Justice Kennedy was
not writing on a clean slate when he chose to strike a new Title
VII balance in favor of whites. The Supreme Court previously
tried to strike a similar balance in Wards Cove and other decisions that cut back on civil rights enforcement. However, Congress responded by overr uling those cases in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.103 Therefore, when Justice Kennedy rewrote Title VII
in Ricci to correspond to the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence, he was usurping legislative policymaking power
from Congress. Congress wanted the close cases to be resolved
in favor of racial minorities, believing that to be the best way
of reducing employment discrimination. But Justice Kennedy
wanted the close cases to be resolved in favor of whites, even if
it meant allowing fire department officers to remain overwhelmingly white.
The Supreme Court’s usurpation of legislative racial
policymaking power in Ricci may be difficult to justify in separation-of-powers terms, but it is hardly unprecedented. As a matter
of relative institutional competence, it is difficult to see why a
politically insulated Supreme Court would view itself as better
able than a politically accountable national legislature to balance
the subtle and complex competing interests that are necessarily
entailed in trying to formulate a coherent national race relations
policy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems always to have
thought that it could do a better job than Congress in mediating
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the nation’s racial tensions. When the Court invalidated congressional efforts to limit the spread of slavery in Dred Scott v. Sanford,104 Congress overruled that decision by securing the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to shift the pre-Civil War federalism balance in
matters involving race from the states to the federal government,
by giving Congress the power to enforce the equality and antidiscrimination provisions of the Amendment.106 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court decision in the Civil Rights Cases107 re-struck
that balance in favor of state sovereignty by reading a “state
action” component into the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
Section Five expressly gave Congress the power to enforce the
Amendment.108 If judicial activism is defined as the disregard of
clearly expressed legislative policy judgments, then Ricci entails
an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
Justice Kennedy used the new “strong basis in evidence” standard as the doctrinal device that would accord his
desired additional weight to the interests of whites in the Title VII
balance. Like the lower courts and the Solicitor General, Justice
Ginsburg thought that that any genuine desire to avoid a disparate-impact violation would suffice to prevent a disparate-treatment violation. She insisted only on the presence of “good cause”
to fear a disparate-impact violation, as a safeguard against frivolous or pretextual disparate-impact claims.109 Justice Ginsburg
also emphasized that the heightened “strong basis in evidence”
standard would frustrate the Title VII preference for voluntary
compliance, by making it hazardous for employers to implement
voluntary remedies for disparate impact. Only a disparate-impact
showing that was strong enough to establish an actual Title VII
violation would be sufficient to immunize employers from potential disparate-treatment violations.110
The law governing contract modifications, as well as the
law of accord and satisfaction governing the settlement of legal
disputes, supports Justice Ginsburg’s view. Reminiscent of Justice Kennedy’s approach, classical contract law would not rec
ognize the presence of consideration supporting a modification or
accord and satisfaction unless the underlying relinquished claim
was in fact a meritorious one.111 However, such a rule made voluntary modifications and settlements largely worthless, because
the underlying legal claim would still have to be adjudicated in
order to establish the validity of the modification or settlement.
After realizing this, modern contract doctrine dispensed with the
need to establish the validity of the underlying claim. It insisted
only on “good faith” motivation, and it did so precisely so that
voluntary modifications and settlements could become legally
enforceable.112
Utilization of the “strong basis in evidence” standard,
therefore, constitutes another important way in which the Ricci
majority undermined the thrust of Title VII—by frustrating the
congressional desire to rely heavily on voluntary rather than
coerced compliance. Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a “strong
basis in evidence” standard thrusts Title VII voluntary compliance back to the days of classical contract law, and in so doing,
undermines the Title VII preference for voluntary compliance.
Moreover, the “strong basis in evidence” standard seems to apply
in a way that benefits whites more than it benefits racial minorities. Although there is ample reason to find a “strong basis in
evidence” supporting the City’s fear of disparate-impact liability,113 there is not a “strong basis in evidence” for the Court to
have rejected the assessment-center and modified-weighting
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alternatives that the city wished to use in lieu of its racially
skewed written exams.114 It seems unlikely that the effect of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard on voluntary
settlements went unnoticed—or was unintended. Without voluntary compliance to supplement formal enforcement of Title VII,
there will simply be fewer occasions in which contested resources
are given to racial minorities rather than to whites.
The unequal application of discrimination law to whites
and racial minorities is illustrated even more clearly by Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion. Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly left open the question of whether the Title
VII disparate-impact provision was constitutional,115 Justice Scalia apparently believed that the provision did violate the Equal
Protection principle of the Constitution by forcing employers to
engage in race-based decisionmaking in order to avoid disparate
impact.116 Justice Scalia then suggested that the disparate-impact
provision of Title VII might be saved if it were viewed as an evidentiary tool to “smoke out” intentional discrimination, but that
such a saving construction would require recognition of a good
faith defense to any disparate-impact claim.117 This is striking
because Justice Scalia also emphasized that a benign motive on
the part of Congress in enacting the disparate-impact provision
could not save the constitutionality of the provision.118 This reasoning creates a curious form of discrimination. When Congress
acts to remedy disparate-impact discrimination, a benign motive
will not save the constitutional validity of its actions.But when
an employer acts to create disparate-impact discrimination, a
benign motive will save the validity of the employer’s actions.
For Justice Scalia, therefore, a good faith, benign motive can be
used to permit racial discrimination, but not to prevent it. A legal
regime that would permit such an outcome is indeed a noteworthy regime.
Justice Alito too wrote a curious concurrence. By arguing that New Haven’s asserted concern with disparate impact was
really a politically motivated desire to placate a minority constituency,119 Justice Alito appears to believe that racial politics is
somehow illegitimate. Although he concedes that racial considerations can sometimes play a permissible role in political bargaining, he says that racial discrimination never can.120 However,
the issue to be decided was whether the City’s decision to forego
certification of the firefighter promotion exam results constituted
permissible racial consideration or impermissible racial discrimination. Justice Alito apparently believed that the City’s actions
constituted a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination,121
but his reasoning was circular. The only evidence that Justice
Alito offered to support his discrimination conclusion was that
the City considered race.122
Justice Alito could not have been pleased by his perception of racial politics in New Haven. One of the black leaders, whom Justice Alito viewed as having been placated by the
Mayor’s administration, once objected to hiring firefighters who
“just have too many vowels in their name[s],”123 an apparent reference to New Haven’s long history of hiring white Italian firefighters instead of blacks.124 This suggests that “racial placation”
had long been the norm rather than the exception in New Haven
politics. If such ubiquitous racial politics were now to be recon
ceptualized as unlawful racial discrimination, it is noteworthy
that Justice Alito wished to effect that reconceptualization when
the long history of New Haven racial politics began to benefit
racial minorities rather than whites. It also makes one wonder
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whether Justice Alito believes that he can realistically exclude
his own racial considerations from the adjudicatory process in
the way that he apparently believes they should be excluded from
the political process.125

2. Standing
Although no Justice mentioned it, the disappointed New
Haven firefighter petitioners may have lacked standing to chal
lenge the City’s failure to certify the promotion exam results.
They may have lacked standing because none of the petitioners
could be sure of receiving the promotions they sought, even if
the exam results had been certified. Under the City’s “rule of
three,” the City Charter required that civil service positions be
filled from among the top three exam performers for each position.126 However, we cannot tell which of the top three candidates would have been chosen for any position. There were eight
lieutenant vacancies, so only eight of the top ten candidates who
qualified for “immediate promotion” to lieutenant under the rule
of three would actually be promoted. Furthermore, there were
seven captain vacancies, so only seven of the top nine candidates
who qualified for “immediate promotion” to captain would be
promoted.127 Collectively, we cannot know which of the eighteen petitioners would have received the fifteen available promotions, but we do know that three of the petitioners would not have
received any of the promotions at all.128
It may seem silly, but under the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, such uncertainty about whether a favorable
ruling will actually redress a plaintiff ’s alleged injury can deprive
that plaintiff of standing. Moreover, a plaintiff ’s failure to establish a redressable injury is not merely a prudential impediment
to standing, but rather can amount to a constitutional defect that
deprives the Court of jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy
provision of Article III.129 On occasion the Supreme Court
has applied this particularized redressability requirement with
remarkable stringency. For example, it denied environmental
plaintiffs standing to enforce certain financial incentive provisions of the Endangered Species Act, because those incentives
might not ultimately result in protection of the endangered species at issue.130 It also denied other environmentalists standing
to challenge mining, oil, and natural gas exploitation of federal
lands, because the plaintiffs did not show with sufficient particularity that they would use the precise tracts of land that were
being opened up for exploitation.131 It even denied indigents
standing to challenge preferential “charity” tax status for hospitals that refused to provide certain charitable medical care to
indigents, because the hospitals might continue to deny such care
even if they were denied preferential tax status.132 In Ricci, no
petitioner could be certain that a favorable ruling would redress
his or her injury, because no petitioner could be certain of getting
a promotion. Indeed, three petitioners could be certain that they
would not get a promotion, although we do not know which three
petitioners they would be.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not always enforce
its standing redressability requirement with such stringency.
Sometimes the Court grants standing despite serious redressability problems, as it did when it granted the State of Massachusetts
standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s
refusal to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions even though
such regulation was not guaranteed to reduce the global warming
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injuries that the State alleged.133 Because the law of standing is in
notorious disarray, it is not surprising that Supreme Court standing decisions are often difficult to reconcile.134 The problem is
that there is one overriding principle that does seem to reconcile
many of the Court’s standing cases. The law of standing often
protects the interests of whites more than it protects the interests
of racial minorities.135
In the 1984 case of Allen v. Wright,136 the Supreme
Court denied standing to black parents who challenged the allegedly unlawful grant of tax-exempt status to segregated private
schools, because those schools might continue to deny admission to blacks even if the tax exempt status of the schools were
revoked. In the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin,137 the Supreme
Court denied standing to black and Latino plaintiffs who challenged exclusionary zoning practices alleged to be intentionally
discriminatory, because the low and moderate income housing
developments that had sought zoning variances still might not
ultimately be constructed even if the exclusionary zoning practices were invalidated. In four police and prosecutorial misconduct cases decided between 1974 and 1983, the Supreme Court
found that a lack of standing and other justiciability defects
barred suits by black victims of allegedly discriminatory police
brutality and other official abuses, because prior official misconduct was moot and the threat of future recurrences was too speculative for injunctive relief to redress any current injury.138
The Supreme Court has been fairly frequent in its denial
of standing to minority plaintiffs who wished to challenge allegedly discriminatory practices that harm racial minorities. However, the Court often grants standing in analogous cases to white
plaintiffs who wish to challenge affirmative action or antidiscrimination practices that benefit minorities. In Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v.
City of Jacksonville,139 the Court granted standing to a white
construction contractor who challenged an affirmative action
program designed to benefit minority contractors, even though
the white contractor was unlikely to be awarded one of the contracts at issue if the affirmative action program were invalidated.
Other Supreme Court cases have similarly granted standing to
whites seeking to challenge affirmative action programs,140 or
voter-redistricting prog rams designed to benefit racial minorities,141 without requiring the strong redressable injury showings
that the Court has demanded of minority plaintiffs. Ricci is a
case that falls on the permissive white-plaintiff side of the line.
It tacitly recognizes the standing of at least three white plaintiffs
to challenge an antidiscrimination law that benefits racial minorities, even though they cannot possibly prove redressabiThe one
final irony that should be noted in the Supreme Court’s tacit grant
of standing to the Ricci plaintiffs is its effective issuance of an
advisory opinion. The purpose of the Article III standing requirement is to help ensure that the federal courts do not issue advisory opinions—opinions that make abstract pronouncements of
law that are unnecessary to the resolution of a concrete “case” or
“controversy” presented in an adversary context.142 Because the
Supreme Court disposed of the Ricci case by granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by the petitioners, the Court ended
up making abstract pronouncements that were dependent on the
resolution of factual issues that seem clearly to have been in dispute. The Court even announced that minority firefighters could
not win a hypothetical Title VII disparate-impact suit if they were
subsequently to file one.143 Moreover, the Court did all of this
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without the vigorous adversary presentation that would have
been available if the Court had followed the customary practice
of remanding a case with contested facts for trial. The Court’s
decision to grant the petitioners summary judgment is therefore
also quite curious.

Summary Judgment
As Justice Kennedy noted, summary judgment is appropriate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any material
fact,” and one party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”144
His opinion went on to hold that “there is no evidence—let alone
the required strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed
because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid
and less discriminatory tests were available to the City.”145 The
assertion that there is “no evidence” questioning job-relatedness
or supporting the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is
simply incorrect. The assertion that there is no “strong basis in
evidence” is the very legal issue that is under dispute.

1. No Evidence
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that there was “no evidence”
supporting the City’s disparate impact fears does not withstand
scrutiny. His opinion itself described evidence in the Civil Service Board hearing record that both questioned the job-relatedness of the City’s promotion exams and suggested the presence
of less discriminatory alternatives. Some witnesses testified that
the exams were outdated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New Haven.146 Others called for a validation study to
determine job-relatedness, because the exams were “inherently
unfair.”147 The competitor consultant testified that “assessment
centers” were not only better at assessing job-relatedness, but
that they would also constitute a less-discriminatory alternative
selection device.148 A college professor with relevant expertise
testified that the New Haven exams may have contained subtle
racial biases that favored whites.149 The City’s legal counsel and
officials in the Mayor’s administration also testified that there
were less discriminatory alternatives to the exams.150
Justice Kennedy’s opinion ignored the additional pertinent evidence highlighted in Ginsburg’s dissent. She pointed to
testimony establishing that most municipalities do not use pencil-and-paper exams to evaluate promotion candidates because
of questions about the sufficiency of those exams in assessing
practical job-related skills. She also cited evidence in the record
establishing that other municipalities use alternate weighting
percentages that place more emphasis on practical skills than on
written exam results.151 Far from containing “no evidence,” the
record was replete with evidence of less discriminatory alternatives that posed fewer job-relatedness problems. Not only were
alternate weightings of exam and practical skills a seemingly better alternative, but the conclusion that assessment centers would
have been a better alternative actually seems to have been uncontested. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rejected these evidentiary
showings out of hand.
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternate weighting option
because he viewed it as prohibited by the New Haven firefighter
union contract, the New Haven City Charter, and the Title VII
prohibition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race.” He
also saw no evidence that the original New Haven exam weighting
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was arbitrary.152 The union contract and City Charter were largely
irrelevant, because they would simply be unlawful if they com
pelled a degree of disparate impact that was prohibited by Title
VII. Also, the fact that the original exam weighting may not have
been arbitrary was simply nonresponsive to the claim that better
alternatives existed. However, the question of whether alternate
weightings would constitute prohibited race-based adjustment of
test scores, as Justice Kennedy argued, or the mere substitution of
an alternate selection procedure, as Justice Ginsburg argued,153
is more serious. Ultimately, however, it simply begs the central
question presented in the case. Proper legal characterization of a
decision by the City to use an alternate weighting process would
turn on whether the City was motivated by genuine disparateimpact concerns when it declined to certify the exam results, or
whether that decision was a mere pretext for racial bias. But the
question of motive certainly seems like a disputed issue of fact
that could have been better resolved by a trial on remand than by
Justice Kennedy’s ex cathedra determination.154
Justice Kennedy rejected the assessment center alternative, even though no one seems to dispute the claim that
assessment centers would have been more job-related and less
discriminatory than written promotion exams. Justice Kennedy
gave only one reason for rejecting the assessment center alternative. He stated that assessment centers would not have been
available for the 2003 firefighter promotions.155 However, that
conclusion was based on a single offhand comment made by
Frank Ricci—one of the very petitioners challenging the City’s
failure to certify the exam results.156 Although Frank Ricci was a
firefighter who worked hard to score well on his promotion exam,
the record does not suggest that he had any expertise whatsoever
in designing, implementing, or evaluating promotion procedures.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, there was no particular reason to
believe that assessment centers—which were in widespread use
in other municipalities at the time—were unavailable to the City
of New Haven.157 Moreover, the record does not disclose any
reason it was important for promotions to be made in 2003, rather
than waiting until assessment center procedures could be established. That is especially noteworthy since the Supreme Court
did not finally order the promotion exam results to be certified
until 2009. Although Justice Kennedy was unwilling to accord
any deference to New Haven’s fear of potential disparate-impact
liability, he was willing to accord total deference to Frank Ricci’s
stated basis for opposition to assessment centers.
The racial politics of which Justice Alito apparently disapproved may well have been viewed by minorities as the only
alternative available to counteract the more entrenched politics
that had caused the City to use its de facto discriminatory promotion procedures for the previous twenty years.158 In a political
climate where a fire department would forego promotion assessment alternatives that were more job-related and less discriminatory than written multiple-choice exams, it is easy to understand
how racial politics could become as salient as Justice Alito found
them to be.159 Whether the City’s effort to deviate from its previous practices was genuine or pretextual seems at least to be
a genuine issue of material fact. Justice Ginsburg notes that it
is common practice for the Supreme Court to remand a case in
which it has announced a new rule of law, so that the trial court
can apply the new rule to the facts.160 That customary practice
certainly seems compelling when factual disputes abound, as
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they did in Ricci, but it was not compelling enough to serve the
purposes of the Ricci majority.

2. No Strong Basis in Evidence
Although it is difficult to defend Justice Kennedy’s
assertion that there was “no evidence” of less discriminatory,
job-related alternatives, Justice Kennedy also asserted that any
evidence that might exist was not sufficient to satisfy the “strong
basis in evidence” standard that the Court was announcing as its
new disparate-impact rule.161 It seems clear that there was significant evidence of less discriminatory, job-related alternatives
contained in the Civil Service Board hearing record. It also seems
clear that any suggestion that such alternatives were lacking was
far from undisputed for summary judgment purposes. But Justice
Kennedy knew all of this. My suspicion is that Justice Kennedy
was not simply making an evidentiary or civil procedure mistake
when he decided to enter summary judgment for the petitioners
despite the existence of striking factual disputes. I suspect that
Justice Kennedy was making a statement about the stringency of
the new disparate-impact rule that the Court was adopting.
By deeming a very strong factual showing of better
alternatives to be insufficient even to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Justice Kennedy communicated that it would
henceforth be very difficult to establish a disparate-impact discrimination claim under Title VII, even when a prima facie case
of disparate impact was statistically demonstrated. The Court
was reinstituting an era of strong deference to employer discretion, in order to immunize employers from disparate-impact
claims. As Justice Ginsburg viewed it, the Court was reverting to
the interpretation of Title VII that it had adopted in Wards Cove,
even though Congress had overruled Wards Cove by statutory
amendment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.162 I believe that Justice Kennedy was conveying the idea that disparate impact claims
would now be as difficult to uphold under the Title VII “strong
basis in evidence” standard as affirmative action programs have
been to uphold under the “strong basis in evidence” Equal Protection standard that Justice Kennedy borrowed.163
Since the conservative voting bloc took firm control of
the Court in race cases after 1990, the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of a racial affirmative action program in only
one case—and even that case seems doctrinally indistinguishable
from another case in which the Court invalidated a similar program on the same day.164 Justice Kennedy’s decision to grant the
petitioners summary judgment in Ricci, despite the existence of
important factual disputes suggests that we can expect outcomes
in future Title VII disparate-impact cases that are similar to the
outcomes we have seen in affirmative action cases. Justice Kennedy himself illustrates this with the “advisory opinion” that
he issued to reject the hypothetical claim asserted by minority
firefighters in the hypothetical New Haven disparate-impact case
that was never even filed.165 Even though such a hypothetical suit
would be filed by different plaintiffs, using legal theories and evidentiary presentations that had not yet been developed—let alone
presented to a court—Justice Kennedy was still confident that
the minority firefighters would lose their case. He could not have
known this unless he had already determined that the “strong basis
in evidence” standard was so heavily tilted toward the interest of
white firefighters that no hypothetical disparate impact would be
sufficient to outweigh the harm to whites.166 This also suggests
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that Justice Ginsburg was correct when she feared that Justice
Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard would undermine
the congressional preference for voluntary compliance with Title
VII.167 For Justice Kennedy, there appears to be very little gap
left to fill between potential liability (under the “strong basis in
evidence” standard) and actual liability (under the statutory Title
VII standard) for voluntary compliance to fill. He appears to be
equally solicitous of white interests under both standards.
The stringency of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard means that the scales are tipped in Title VII cases
before the Court even begins its analysis. Because the Court has
now detected a conflict between the statute’s disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions, the Court must balance competing interests to resolve that conflict. The “strong basis in evidence” standard means that when unclear or disputed evidence
is in equipoise, the balance will be struck in favor of protecting
the white interest in avoiding disparate-treatment discrimination,
rather than in favor of the racial minority interest in avoiding
disparate-impact discrimination. It is unclear why a tie should
go to the white interests under a statute that was enacted to prevent discrimination against racial minorities—unless the Court
believes that times have changed so much that whites are now the
primary victims of racial discrimination.

Postracial Discrimination
Postracial discrimination is discrimination against racial
minorities that purports to be merely a ban on discrimination
against whites. It is premised on the belief that active discrimination against racial minorities has largely ceased to exist, and
that the lingering effects of past discrimination have now largely
dissipated. As a result, a prospective commitment to colorblind
race neutrality is now sufficient to promote racial equality, and
any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful
discrimination. Although versions of this view have been around
since the era of official segregation,168 the claim that we now
live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility
from the success of prominent racial minorities in roles that were
traditionally reserved for whites. Those successes have ranged
from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a
traditionally white game,169 to the selection of black politician
Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party,170 to the election
of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.171
As recent events have indicated, however, the claim that
we now live in a postracial society is quite premature. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates still believed that he was being
racially profiled in 2009 when he was arrested by a white police
officer after allegedly breaking into his own house.172 The suburban Philadelphia Valley Swim Club still thought it was appropriate to exclude black children from its swimming pool in 2009.173
And the 2009 death of singer Michael Jackson reminded us that
the “King of Pop” lived in a culture that caused him to think
that he could increase his popular appeal by lightening the color
of his skin.174 Because the culture that we live in is actually far
from postracial in nature, supposed efforts to prevent whites from
being victimized by racial minorities end up entailing nothing
more than a new form of old fashioned discrimination.
The Supreme Court has played its part in this form of
postracial discrimination by inverting the traditional concepts of
Fall 2009

perpetrators and victims in a way that allows the Court ultimately
to invert the concepts of discrimination and equality themselves.
Ricci serves as an example of such postracial discrimination,
and other postracial discrimination decisions handed down by
the Roberts Court belie any suggestion that Ricci was merely an
aberration. Moreover, the Roberts Court’s postracial discrimination decisions are reminiscent of historical Supreme Court decisions that were issued when the Court was openly hostile to racial
minority rights, thereby further calling the legitimacy of those
Roberts Court decisions into question.

A. Conceptual Inversion
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Ricci dissent,175
when the City of New Haven decided to forego reliance on the
racially disparate results of its firefighter promotion exams, it was
not acting in a vacuum. Rather, the decision was part of the City’s
effort to counteract a long history of racial employment discrimi
nation practiced by the New Haven fire department. Historically,
whites were the perpetrators of discriminatory hiring and promotion decisions, and racial minorities were the victims.176 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci inverted the concepts of per
petrator and victim in a way that treated minorities as if they
were the perpetrators and whites as if they were the victims.177
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion was even more emphatic in
its depiction of whites as the victims of partisan racial politics in New Haven.178 The Court’s inversion of the distinction
between perpetrators and victims has, in turn, prompted a more
fundamental inversion in the core concepts of discrimination and
equality themselves, so that contemporary racial discrimination
has now come to be viewed as equal, while remedial equality has
come to be viewed as discriminatory.179

1. Perpetrators

and

Victims

In a zero-sum resource allocation context, the roles of
perpetrator and victim can be initially assigned and subsequently
inverted simply by shifting the analytical baseline that is used
to conduct a discrimination analysis. A baseline is the thing that
separates the propositions that are actively addressed in formulating an analytical argument from the propositions that are simply assumed to be true without any effort to justify their validity.
When analytical attention is focused on the issues that lie above
the baseline, tacit assumptions that lie beneath the baseline often
slip through unnoticed, and are passively accepted without any
analytical justification. Indeed, baseline shifting works best as a
persuasive technique when its baseline assumptions are able to
do their work in a way that is largely undetected.180
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci held that it
was unfair to deny the disappointed petitioners the promotions to
which they were entitled as a result of their superior performance
on the written firefighter exams.181 That holding rested on the
tacit baseline assumption that those who perform well on promotion exams are entitled to merit-based promotions. Therefore,
the issue presented in Justice Kennedy’s opinion was whether a
deviation from the merit-based promotions to which the petitioners were entitled was justified in order to advance the independent goal of reducing the racially disparate impact produced by
the promotion exams. Stated in this way, the claims of the disappointed petitioners seem both strong and sympathetic, because it
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is common to use promotion exams for the purpose of assessing Legal Realists have taught us that the job of lawyers and judges is
merit. As a result, the baseline assumption—the assumption that to manipulate legal doctrine for instrumental purposes. However,
those who scored well on their exams were entitled to promo- one cannot help but wonder why Justice Kennedy and a majority
tions—went largely unscrutinized. However, if the analytical of the Justices on the Supreme Court would view this inversion
baseline is shifted down, so that the baseline assumption is high- of the conventional Title VII understanding as normatively desirlighted and actively scrutinized, the claim of the disappointed able. It is likely that their actions in Ricci reflect a more fundapetitioners loses much of its force.
mental inversion of the concepts of discrimination and equality
The assumption that the petitioners were entitled to pro- themselves.
motions because they had performed well on their written exams
is not a valid assumption under Title VII. Title VII does not even 2. Discrimination and Equality
require the use of written exams in awarding promotions. What
The view that minorities have become the perpetrators
Title VII does require is that promotions be awarded in a way that
and whites have become the victims of
is not racially discriminatory, and disparate
racial discrimination in the United States
impact is an expressly prohibited form of
discrimination under Title VII. Accordeven if the petitioners did also inverts the conventional concepts of
discrimination and equality by substituting
ingly, even if the petitioners did perform
perform well on their written for each the behavior and attitudes that we
well on their written exams, they still had
no right to be promoted when their promo- exams, they still had no right previously used to define the other. It used
tions would produce a racially disparate
to be promoted when their to be that the history of racial discrimination in the United States caused us to view
impact. A non-validated promotion exam
promotions would produce a existing distributional inequalities as the
that produces a racially disparate impact is
racially disparate impact. products of past and present discrimination,
simply an unlawful employment practice—
and to view racially redistributive efforts as
especially in a case such as Ricci, where
remedial measures that were necessary to
less-discriminatory, job-related alternatives
move us toward the goal of nondiscrimiexist.
The adoption of an analytical baseline necessarily natory equality. Now, however, we appear to view the existing
entails a normative judgment. There is no “natural” baseline racially-correlated distribution of resources as something that
that can serve as the foundation for legal analysis, because the actually defines equality by honoring the individual differences
instrumental nature of baselines means that they can always be that exist between us, and we view racially-redistributive efforts
contested by specifying some different instrumental objective.182 as discriminatory rather than remedial. If there is no longer
Justice Kennedy’s instrumental objective, reflected in the base- any appreciable level of discrimination against racial minoriline assumption underlying his majority opinion, was to enforce ties, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities cannot be
the Title VII requirement of race-neutral fairness to firefighters justified as remedial. Instead, they are simply a form of “reverse
who performed well on their promotion exams.183 Justice Gins- discrimination,” that is inconsistent with the constitutional and
statutory principles of equality to which we
burg’s instrumental objective, reflected in
claim an enduring commitment. Inverting
the baseline assumption underlying her
dissent, was that Title VII requires an end The view that minorities have the concepts of discrimination and equality
to the historic practice of disparate-impact become the perpetrators and in this way might make sense if the United
States is now a postracial culture, in which
discrimination.184 There is no way to decide
between these competing instrumental whites have become the victims current racial equality has finally triumphed
of racial discrimination in over our long history of prior inequality. If
objectives without asserting a normative
preference for one objective over the other. the United States also inverts the United States has not yet achieved this
postracial status, however, the conceptual
But the normative preference asserted
by Justice Kennedy iIt seems reasonably the conventional concepts of inversion simply becomes a new form of
clear that the enactment of Title VII’s pro discrimination and equality racial discrimination—one that insists on
preservation of existing inequalities in
hibitions on employment discrimination
by substituting for each the the
order to benefit whites.
rested on the belief that racial and other
behavior and attitudes that
It is hard to believe that someone
minorities were the victims of widespread
discriminatory practices being perpetrated we previously used to define could seriously contend that the problem of
discrimination against racial minorities is
against them by white employers and labor
the other.
a problem that is now behind us.187 Whites
unions.185 The United States has had a long
still have a significant advantage over racial
history of pervasive—and often violent—
minorities in the allocation of societal
white discrimination against racial minori188
ties, but racial discrimination against the white majority has resources, and race obviously remains a salient social category
189 However, the
never been a particular problem—at least not until now. Despite that is often used to disadvantage minorities.
the racial history of the United States, Justice Kennedy chose to election of Barack Obama as President of the United States has
invert the Title VII concepts of perpetrators and victims, so that nevertheless fueled characterization of the contemporary period
whites would be viewed as the victims in Ricci, and racial minori as a postracial era in which minorities are able to compete suc190
ties would be viewed as the perpetrators.186 There is nothing cessfully against whites on a level playing field. Under this
analytically impermissible about this doctrinal maneuver—the
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view, the real racial problem in the Untied States is the problem
of minorities discriminating against whites.
A pertinent Comment appeared in The New Yorker,
shortly after the 2009 Cambridge police arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates in his own home.191Staff writer Kelefa
Sanneh highlighted a number of ways in which minorities have
been blamed for racist attitudes toward whites: Obama’s former
pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, was called racist and antiwhite for his sermons; Obama himself was accused of insulting
white people when he referred to his grandmother as a “typical white person;” then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s “wise Latina”
remark was referred to as “racist;” and Obama’s claim that the
Cambridge Police had “acted stupidly” in arresting Professor
Gates was characterized as “racial self-aggrandizement,” which
revealed a “deep-seated hatred for white people” that made
Obama himself “a racist.”192 Even discounting for the hyperbole
that is often used to score rhetorical points, those accusations
do seem to show that many whites have come to feel genuinely
aggrieved by current racial politics.
Sanneh then went on to make an important point. He
said that the accusations of “reverse racism” that are often used
to combat affirmative action in the post-Civil Rights era have
been so successful that reverse racism against whites has now
come to be viewed as systemic rather than personal. Whites like
Frank Ricci do not simply feel that they are occasionally victimized by the isolated deeds of bad actors. They feel as if the whole
system is skewed in favor of racial minorities, and is therefore
stacked against them.193 The irony here is striking. Title VII was
rooted in the belief that racial equality could be achieved only
by neutralizing the systemic discrimination that existed against
racial minorities, but the postracial Ricci view is that equality
can be attained only by reinstituting the institutional practices
that used to constitute discrimination. Stated more concretely,
under Title VII, a non-validated, multiple-choice exam that had
a racially disparate impact used to be viewed as the very definition of systemic discrimination. Now reinstating the results of
that exam is necessary to prevent systemic discrimination against
whites. Sanneh concluded that aggrieved whites have now commandeered the term “racism”. Racial minorities can still talk
about isolated issues that affect racial minority interests, but the
term “racism” has now acquired a cultural meaning that equates
it with mistreatment of the white majority by racial minorities.194
The view that contemporary culture now entails this
new form of systemic minority discrimination against whites,
rather than the more traditional forms of white discrimination
against minorities, would seem to be legally irrelevant even if
true. The Supreme Court has insisted in its constitutional affirmative action decisions that the Equal Protection principle does
not prohibit general “societal discrimination.” Particularized acts
of identifiable discrimination are illegal, but the subtler forms
of cultural behavior and attitudes that have systemically caused
whites to do better than racial minorities in most social, political and economic categories are not prohibited by the Court’s
conception of Equal Protection.195 That Supreme Court holding
has always been problematic,196 but it nevertheless remained the
established law for as long as racial minorities were the ones
viewed as the victims of such societal discrimination. If the
Supreme Court were to retreat from its refusal to recognize the
legal legitimacy of societal discrimination because it now viewed
whites as the victims, the Supreme Court would be changing the
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rules in a racially motivated way. That would, of course, lend credence to the view that we continue to live in a culture that dis
criminates against racial minorities.
The fact that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Ricci could be viewed as offering even a credible construction of
Title VII shows that the Court’s inversion of the traditional discrimination and equality concepts has a receptive audience. However, it is still difficult to take the postracial hypothesis on which
that inversion rests seriously. White discrimination against racial
minorities remains a serious cultural problem, while minority
discrimination against whites seems at best to be merely marginal. The continuing maldistribution of societal resources along
racial lines strongly rebuts the validity of any postracial-society
claim that one might be inclined to assert. Minorities are disproportionately burdened by high unemployment rates, high levels
of poverty and low access to health care. Minority schools remain
segregated and they offer educational opportunities that are significantly worse than the opportunities offered in white schools.
Minorities are still discriminated against in the job market, in real
estate markets, and in consumer transactions. Moreover, when
minorities do get jobs they are paid less than whites with equivalent levels of education. The biases that lead to these inequalities are both conscious and unconscious, and they show no signs
of abating in the near future.197 Harvard sociologist William
Julius Wilson has stated that we cannot be considered a postracial society as long as so many minorities are disproportionately
concentrated at the low end of the socio-economic scale. When
economic conditions deteriorate, minorities are always the ones
who suffer as the targets of white frustrations.198
It is true that the President of the United States is
now black, but that does not mean that the society that elected
him has become postracial. One could choose to characterize Obama’s election in different ways. One could characterize
it as demonstrating that minorities can now compete on a level
playing field, without the need for affirmative action or serious
antidiscrimination measures. Alternatively, one could characterize Obama’s election as demonstrating only that a mixed-race,
multiple Ivy League graduate, with the intellectual and political
skills to become President of the Harvard Law Review can successfully navigate contemporary racial culture—thereby providing little evidence of how less-exceptional racial minority group
members are likely to fare on a playing field that is far from
level. As Professor Darren Hutchinson has noted, the “postracial”
claim may simply illustrate the phenomenon of “racial exhaustion.” Whites have simply grown tired of having to deal with the
discrimination claims asserted by racial minorities.199 As a result
of this fatigue, whites may now have decided to assert retaliatory
discrimination claims of their own.
For me, the claim that our culture is now postracial is
seriously undermined by the now-famous Henry Louis Gates
arrest in 2009. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was
arrested by white Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley
after Professor Gates broke into his own home because the front
door was stuck. A neighbor who feared that a criminal might be
breaking into the house called the police. The events that followed are disputed, but Professor Gates ended up accusing Sergeant Crowley of racial profiling, and Sergeant Crowley ended up
arresting Professor Gates. Because Sergeant Crowley knew that
Professor Gates lived in the house at the time that the arrest was
made, President Obama stated in response to a news conference
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question that the police had “acted stupidly”—a comment that he
later “recalibrated.” These events attracted an enormous amount
of media attention, and things ultimately calmed down after Sergeant Crowley, Professor Gates and President Obama all met for
a beer together at the White House.200 I do not know what actually happened. I suspect that all parties probably “overreacted”
in some sense, but that is my point. Racial tensions are still so
high in even a northeastern university community that what
might have been an innocuous non-event became a hot-button
racial issue. Sergeant Crowley may well have thought that he was
being verbally abused simply for doing his job, and Professor
Gates may well have thought that he was being arrested for acting like an uppity nigger. An environment in which racial nerves
are still that raw can hardly be viewed as an environment that is
postracial.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the claim that we
now live in a postracial society—a society where our most pressing discrimination problem is the problem of racial discrimination against the white majority—comes from the Supreme Court
itself. The current Supreme Court commonly rules in favor of
whites and against racial minorities in contemporary race cases.
Moreover, it rules this way even though it has had to strain prior
antidiscrimination doctrine to do so. When the Supreme Court
goes out of its way to favor white interests over the interests of
racial minorities, the culture in which that Court operates can
hardly be said to be postracial in any meaningful sense of the
term. The Supreme Court favored the interests of whites over the
interests of racial minorities in Ricci, and it has done so in a
host of other race cases as well. When viewed in the context of
these collective racial decisions, the Supreme Court emerges as
an institution that facilitates discrimination against racial minorities rather than an institution that promotes equality.

B. Context
The Ricci decision did not occur in isolation. It was a
5–4 decision handed down by the conservative voting bloc of
the Roberts Court, which in its brief history has already issued
a number of decisions that favored the interests of whites over
the interests of racial minorities. Some of those decisions were
issued the same Term as Ricci, and some were issued in prior
Terms. But the racial tenor of all those decisions suggests a general hostility to the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and
precedents that were initially adopted to protect the interests of
racial minorities from continued oppression by whites. Unfortunately, the racial tenor of those Roberts Court decisions is also
reminiscent of decisions issued by the Supreme Court in earlier
eras, when the Court was openly antagonistic to the rights of
racial minorities. Consistent with the theory of postracial discrimination, what emerges from the Roberts Court decisions is
a Supreme Court that views its function to be that of protecting
the white majority from discrimination claims asserted by racial
minorities.

1. Roberts Court Discrimination
John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice of the
United States in 2005.201 Since his confirmation, the Roberts
Supreme Court has issued decisions that favored the interests
of whites over the interests of racial minorities in a number of
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cases. In addition to Ricci, those cases include decisions that
have rejected minority allegations of racial discrimination in the
areas of voting rights, racial profiling, English language education, and school resegregation.
a. Voting Rights.
Ricci was probably the most significant race case that
the Roberts Court decided during its 2008 Term, but another
closely watched case was Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder.202 In Northwest Austin, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 remained constitutional in light of the
increased minority voting participation that has occurred since
1965. Section 5 seeks to prevent future voting discrimination
against racial minorities by requiring jurisdictions with a history
of prior voting discrimination to obtain federal preclearance from
the Department of Justice or from a three-judge Federal District
Court in the District of Columbia for any changes that they wish
to make in their voting practices or procedures. In 2006, Congress voted overwhelmingly to reauthorize Section 5 for another
twenty five years. This was the fourth time the Act had been
reauthorized by Congress since 1965. However, the plaintiff utility district argued that Section 5 could not constitutionally be
applied to it because there was no evidence that the utility district
had ever engaged in voting discrimination. A three-judge district
court rejected the claim, but the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question by holding that the utility district could apply
for a Section 5 waiver under the statute’s “bailout” provision.203
It might at first seem as if Northwest Austin was decided
in a way that was favorable to the interest of racial minority voters, because the Court declined to hold Section 5 unconstitutional.204 However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts
left little doubt that he believed Section 5 to be unconstitutional
in light of the increased minority participation in voting that
occurred since the original adoption of the Voting Rights Act in
1965. Discussing two potentially applicable constitutional standards, he concluded that “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirements
and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions
under either test.”205
Northwest Austin and Ricci are alike in at least two
important respects. First, in both cases the Court practiced postracial discrimination by supplanting an unambiguous statutory
effort to protect racial minorities with a dubious judicial effort
to protect whites.206 In Northwest Austin, Congress decided as
recently as 2006 that minority voters still needed the voting
rights protections of Section 5. It did so by a vote of 390-33 in
the House and 98-0 in the Senate, after extensive legislative hearings, and a voluminous legislative record.207 In Ricci, Congress
not only adopted Title VII in 1964 to protect racial minorities
from employment discrimination at the hands of whites, but it
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to
overrule prior Supreme Court decisions that proved excessively
protective of white employer interests, and insufficiently protective of racial minority rights.208 Both cases, therefore, illustrate
the Court’s propensity to undermine congressional antidiscrimination initiatives when the Court disagrees with the racial policies that they embody.
Second, both Northwest Austin and Ricci sought to
engage in racial policymaking through the technique of regulatory “chill,” rather than through the process of direct adjudication.
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Because the race relations issues that underlie the Voting Rights
Act and Title VII are pure legislative policy issues, the Supreme
Court was understandably reluctant to invalidate the two statutes
directly. To have done so would have subjected the Court to a
potential political backlash, and to questions about the Court’s
usurpation of legislative policymaking powers in a way that was
inconsistent with separation of powers principles. In both cases,
what the Court did instead was to issue in terrorem dicta that was
designed to advance the Court’s postracial policy agenda without forcing the Court to internalize the attendant political costs.
Therefore, in Northwest Austin, the Court threatened to hold Section 5 unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be
chilled into adopting “saving” modifications of the statute that
better protected the interests of the Court’s white constituents.209
Similarly, in Ricci, the Court tacitly threatened to hold Title VII
unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be chilled
from once again overruling by statute the Court’s postracial
administration of Title VII.210
It is not clear how successful these dictum threats will
prove to be, but they will almost certainly contribute to a political
climate in which the representative branches will have to consider rejuvenated reverse discrimination claims that are asserted
by whites. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in the
voting rights context. If the Northwest Austin decision causes
the upcoming 2010 census to be followed by a plethora of Voting Rights Act redistricting challenges such as those that arose
after the 1990 census,211 racial minorities are likely to end up
suffering new forms of vote dilution. After the 1990 census, the
Justice Department was able to negotiate redistricting plans that
did not unduly dilute minority voting strength by threatening to
withhold Section 5 preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.212
Now, however, the Supreme Court decision in Northwest Austin
may not only encourage whites to file redistricting challenges to
efforts aimed at protecting minority voting strength, but it may
also reduce the Justice Department’s negotiating leverage to
resist such challenges. If a covered jurisdiction wishes to engage
in redistricting that will increase relative white voting strength,
by diluting minority voting strength, that jurisdiction can simply
thumb its nose at Justice Department threats to deny preclearance. Defiant jurisdictions will now have every incentive to risk
litigation, gambling that the Supreme Court will simply declare
Section 5 to be unconstitutional the next time a Section 5 challenge is presented to the Court.
The Roberts Court also decided a second voting rights
case during its 2008 Term. Bartlett v. Strickland,213 was itself a
redistricting case, in which the conservative bloc held 5–4 that
the Voting Rights Act prohibitions on minority vote dilution did
not apply to so-called “crossover districts.” A crossover district
is a district in which minorities do not comprise a majority of
the voting population, but comprise a large enough percentage to
elect a candidate of their choice by forming political coalitions
with whites. The issue presented was whether splitting a crossover district in a way that deprived its minority voters of a realistic chance to elect the candidate of their choice constituted vote
dilution of minority voting strength that was prohibited by the
Voting Rights Act.214 In announcing the judgment of the Court,
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion held that splitting the district
did not violate the Voting Rights Act, because minorities had to
comprise at least 50% of the voting population in a district in
order to qualify for vote dilution protection under the Act.215
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Justice Souter’s dissent not only disagreed with the 50%
requirement, but argued that reading such a requirement into the
Act perversely encouraged racial bloc voting rather than interracial voting coalitions. Justice Souter believed that the majority
provided an incentive for states to pack minority voters into fewer
majority-minority voting districts. It also punished minorities
who were able to form voting coalitions with whites, by denying
them statutory protections from vote dilution.216 Justice Souter
stressed that minority vote dilution could be accomplished not
merely by minority vote dispersion, but also by the very minority
vote packing that the Court’s holding encouraged.217
Although the Bartlett decision is in many respects technical, the ultimate effect of the decision is to increase white voting strength by decreasing minority voting strength. By denying
statutory vote dilution protections to crossover districts, minorities will have less influence in the electoral process than they
would have had if crossover districts were protected, because
minorities will be able to control the electoral outcome in fewer
voting districts. Once again, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argued
that granting vote dilution protections to racial minorities that
white voters did not have would discriminate against whites.218
As in Ricci, he indicated that reading the statute to compel such
racial considerations might make the statute unconstitutional.219
Also reminiscent of Ricci, he viewed the society as postracial,
because the existence of crossover districts now showed that the
Voting Rights Act had “by definition” been successful in reducing racial discrimination in voting.220 But as in Ricci as well,
Justice Kennedy’s postracial opinion seems to ignore the fact that
it is racial minorities rather than whites who suffer the types of
historical discrimination that the pertinent statutes were intended
to remedy.221
b. Racial Profiling.
The Roberts Court conservative bloc issued another
5–4 decision during its 2008 Term in the racial profiling case of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.222 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
held that a Pakistani Muslim immigrant who was detained after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not adequately state
a cause of action when he claimed that high level Justice Department officials, including the Attorney General and the Director of
the FBI, singled him out for “harsh confinement” because of his
religion and ethnicity.223 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that the defendants “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh treatment, and that they did so
“as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” The complaint further alleged that the Attorney General was
the “principal architect” of the policy, and the FBI Director was
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.”224 Although the lower courts upheld the adequacy of the
complaint,225 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that the allegations
in the complaint were too conclusory and insufficiently plausible.
They were too conclusory because they did not contain specific
factual allegations, but rather were nothing more than “a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination
claim.”226 They were insufficiently plausible because there were
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons why law enforcement officials would have focused on Arab Muslims following a terrorist
attack by Arab Muslim hijackers.227 Moreover, because the high
level Justice Department officials were not subject to vicarious
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liability, any plausible misconduct by lower level officials would
not prevent dismissal of Iqbal’s complaint against the high level
officials.228
The Iqbal Court’s dissatisfaction with “conclusory”
pleadings, and its insistence on a stringent “plausibility” standard, seem inconsistent with the idea of notice pleading that was
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.229 The
Court, however, also held “implausible” an Arab Muslim’s allegation that discriminatory racial profiling caused him to be targeted for post-9-11 harsh confinement. To me, it is the Court’s
holding that seems “implausible.” Given the nation’s current
anxieties and fears about Arab and Muslim terrorism, and the
alleged involvement of high level federal officials in formulating United States torture policy,230 racial profiling seems more
likely than not. As in Ricci, however, Justice Kennedy once again
gave the benefit of the doubt to white claims of legitimacy rather
than to racial minority claims of discrimination. As in Ricci, Justice Kennedy seemed intent on precluding any opportunity for
an inquiry into the actual facts—entering summary judgment in
Ricci and dismissing the complaint in Iqbal. And as in Ricci, Justice Kennedy had to strain the meaning of existing law in order
effectuate his inversion of the perpetrators and the victims.
c. English Language Education.
Yet another Roberts Court 2008 Term decision that
disadvantaged racial minorities was Horne v. Flores.231 In an
opinion by Justice Alito, the conservative bloc voted 5–4 to
reverse the District Court and Court of Appeals holdings that Arizona was violating the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974 by failing to provide adequate educational opportunities for
students with limited English language proficiency. The Equal
Educational Opportunities Act is an antidiscrimination statute
that prohibits the denial of “equal educational opportunity on
account of race, color, sex or national origin.” It further prohibits
“the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by
its students in its instructional programs.”232 In 1992, the plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the State’s alleged failure to
provide adequate educational opportunities for minority at-risk
and limited English proficient children. Beginning in 2000, the
lower courts began issuing a series of orders that required the
adoption of minimal educational standards and increased funding
to comply with the Act. The State’s repeated failures to comply
ultimately led to contempt citations. The lower courts also denied
the State’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from the compliance
order, which the State argued had become inequitable in light of
changed circumstances.233
Justice Alito’s opinion reversed, stating that the lower
courts should have been more flexible in ruling on the Rule 60(b)
(5) motion, because such motions perform a particularly important function in “institutional reform litigation” where “sensitive federalism concerns” are involved.234 Here the lower courts
had been insufficiently flexible, because they focused too much
attention on whether the prior funding orders had been complied with, and not enough attention on the question of whether
changed circumstances brought the State into compliance with
the Act in a way that made enforcement of the original order
inequitable.235 Justice Alito therefore stated that a remand was
necessary to determine if changed circumstances were provided by factors including new educational strategies adopted
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by the State, and cong ressional enactment of the No Child Left
Behind statute.236 Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the lower
courts adequately considered the factors relevant to a changedcircumstances inquiry, and that adequate funding was essential
to compliance with the Act.237 Justice Breyer concluded that the
Court’s decision would hinder congressional efforts to ensure
that Spanish-speaking students will learn the English skills necessary to participate in a society where English is the predominant language.238
Commentators have viewed Horne as establishing a new
Rule 60(B)(5) standard for relief from court orders in institutional litigation that will undermine finality by permitting litigants to reopen remedial injunctions that have been issued to
control their conduct.239 For present purposes, however, Justice
Breyer’s concern that the decision will frustrate congressional efforts to provide equal educational opportunities to Spanish-speaking minorities is particularly pertinent. Among the
allegations made by the plaintiffs was the claim that Arizona’s
school finance scheme “is just sufficient to let less distressed,
predominantly Anglo districts impart State-mandated essential
skills to their mainstream student bodies” without providing sufficient funds for minority students to acquire the same skills.240
Although this claim was first asserted in 1992, by 2009 the plaintiffs had still not received the relief they requested. Despite lower
court decisions and contempt citations ordering such relief, the
Roberts Court simply remanded for yet another round of proceeding. Moreover, it did so in an opinion whose tone suggested
that the Court disfavored granting any relief. Consistent with its
postracial orientation, the Roberts Court again appears to believe
that there is no longer any real discrimination problem to remedy,
and that racial minorities are simply asking for more than they
are entitled to receive. And again, it adopted this position despite
the existence of a federal statute that seems designed to remedy
the precise problem of which the plaintiffs complained.
d. Resegregation.
In its 2006 Term, the conservative bloc of the Roberts Court issued a 5–4 decision in the school Resegregation
Cases.241 The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts
invalidated voluntary race-conscious efforts by the Seattle and
Louisville school boards to prevent the resegregation of public schools that was occurring as a result of residential resegregation.242 In previous years, both school districts eventually
achieved integration after making strenuous efforts to comply
with the Supreme Court decisions in Brown.243 When population
shifts began to produce resegregation, the school boards became
convinced that only race conscious student assignment could
preserve the integrated nature of the schools. Accordingly both
school boards adopted narrow integration plans, affecting a small
number of students, that considered race when a student’s desired
school assignment would force a school’s racial makeup to fall
outside of a predetermined integration range.244 White parents
who did not receive their desired school assignments challenged
the plans. 245 The Court then reversed the lower courts and held
the plans to be unconstitutional because they were not narrowly
tailored to advance the interest of the schools in promoting student diversity.246
Although Brown was issued to desegregate public
schools, Chief Justice Roberts read the Brown decision itself as
invalidating the integration plans that were adopted to prevent
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resegregation.247 He justified this conclusion by asserting that a felt a need to distance itself from those historical and contemposchool board was prohibited from considering race regardless of rary decisions, rather than risk being aligned with them. I fear
its benign motive.248 He concluded his opinion by stating that that the reason may be that the conservative bloc Justices on the
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop Roberts Court actually favor such an alignment.
discriminating on the basis of race.”249 Justice Breyer’s dissent
The historical Supreme Court was no friend to racial
argued that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with Brown, minorities. In the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh,253 the
and with a range of other Supreme Court precedents. He stressed Supreme Court upheld the seizure of indigenous Indian lands by
that because other race neutral ways of addressing the problem the United States. In the 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sanford,254
proved inadequate, the Court’s decision left school districts with the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Missouri Comprono effective way to prevent resegregation.250
mise Act of 1820, which Congress enacted in an effort to limit
The Court’s decision in the Resegregation Cases seems the spread of slavery in new United States territories. The Court
to epitomize the conceptual inversion of discrimination and not only held that the statute interfered with the property rights
equality that animates the Court’s postracial view of contempo- of white slave owners, but it also held that blacks could not be
rary culture.251 When the decision in the Resegregation Cases is citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution.255
juxtaposed to the 5–4 conservative bloc decision in 2009, denying The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott256 after the
a black defendant post-conviction access to evidence for DNA Civil War, when other Reconstruction constitutional amendments
testing,252 it appears that white parents have a stronger constitu and implementing legislation were also enacted to promote equal
tional right to send their children to segregated schools than post- rights for former black slaves. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
conviction criminal defendants have to test the evidence offered began limiting the remedial scope of the amendments, and even
against them in a way that could establish their innocence. It takes invalidated some of their implementing legislation.257 In the 1896
quite a stretch of the legal imagination to
case of Plessy v. Ferguson,258 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Jim
conclude that Brown v. Board of Education requires the resegregation of public There is now a fairly standard Crow official segregation in public faciliDespite some formal minority victoschools. Yet the aphorism with which
litany of infamous decisions ties.
ries, the Court commonly capitulated to
Chief Justice Roberts ends his Resegregain which historical Supreme Southern white supremacist attitudes. It
tion opinion attests to his possession of
such an imagination. The Chief Justice, Courts have openly sacrificed acquiesced to Southern evasion efforts to
blacks the right to vote, to replace
and the other members of the Supreme
the interests of racial minorities deny
slavery with peonage, to preserve segCourt conservative voting bloc on race,
appear to believe that the nation’s racial to advance the interests of white regated transportation, and to preserve
problems can be solved by a mere commit slave holders, segregationists, housing segregation.259 The Court also
capitulated to Southern racism in
ment to prospective race neutrality. The
and other white supremacists. often
Roberts Court’s recent race decisions turn
the criminal justice system by permitting
a blind eye to the continuing effects of
racial seg regation in the jury box and on
prior discrimination, and to the structural
the witness stand. It sometimes allowed
forces that continue to perpetuate subtle forms of institutional apparently innocent black defendants to be imprisoned or even
discrimination. In cases ranging from firefighter promotions to executed, rather than interfere with the procedural sovereignty of
school resegregation, the Court seems to care very little about the Southern state courts.260
interests of racial minorities—and very much about the interests
In the mid-Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court’s
of the white majority. Inequalities suffered by racial minorities racial performance was little better. In the 1944 case of Koresimply do not seem to count when the Court submits to the lure matsu v. United States,261 the Court upheld the constitutionality
of postracial discrimination. Unfortunately, this aligns the Rob of a World War II order excluding Japanese-American citizens
erts Court with prior Supreme Courts that were more transpa from their own homes on the West Coast, which led to the internrently committed to the practice of racial minority oppression.
ment of Japanese-Americans in detention centers. After the official segregation doctrine of Plessy was invalidated by the 1954
Brown school desegregation case,262 the Court still refused
2. Historical Discrimination
to order immediate desegregation. Instead, Brown II required
The postracial discriminatory decisions of the Rob- desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” which permitted
erts Court are reminiscent of the overt discriminatory decisions Brown to be evaded by massive Southern resistance for nearly
issued by prior Supreme Courts. There is now a fairly stan- a decade.263 Then, when the school desegregation effort moved
dard litany of infamous decisions in which historical Supreme out of the South, the Court articulated a distinction between de
Courts have openly sacrificed the interests of racial minorities to facto and de jure discrimination—a distinction that has permitted
advance the interests of white slave holders, segregationists, and most schools in the United States to remain de facto segregated
other white supremacists. Traces of those historical decisions can even today.264 The year after Brown was decided, the Supreme
also be found in more recent contemporary cases, including those Court also declined to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute
that have imposed constitutional limits on school desegregation, in Naim v. Naim,265 even though Brown almost certainly rendered
racial redistricting, and racial affirmative action. The Roberts the statute unconstitutional. More recently, Brown has been read
Court’s postracial discrimination cases can be easily aligned with as establishing a colorblind race-neutrality requirement that the
those prior decisions, in terms of both tone and outcome. Accord- Court now uses to invalidate race-conscious affirmative action
ingly, one cannot help but wonder why the Roberts Court has not and redistricting programs.266
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The tone and outcomes of the historical Court’s decisions sometimes made the Court’s hostility to racial minority
interests unmistakable. In frequently quoted language from his
opinion in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney described the framers’
view of black slaves. Not only could blacks not be citizens, but
they were at the time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them.267
Chief Justice Taney went on to say that blacks “had for
more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”268 Hopefully,
that is no longer a widely shared view of racial minorities, and it
is certainly not a view that is often expressed in polite company.
Nevertheless, the tone of Roberts Court race cases sometimes
reflects a disregard of racial minority interests that strikes me as
similarly callous.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci displays an understandably sincere concern for the interests of white firefighters
who scored well on their promotion exams. However, it displays
a near total lack of concern for the interests of racial minorities,
who daily suffer the relentless disparate-impact harms that Title
VII was adopted and amended to prevent.269 Moreover, by adopting an unrealistically high standard for the avoidance of disparate-impact injuries, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to place
any meaningful remedy for such harms beyond the practical reach
of Title VII, and perhaps beyond the reach of the Constitution as
well.270 The position of the disappointed New Haven firefighters seems to be that abandoning a resource allocation criterion
that favors whites constitutes racial discrimination against the
white majority, and that seems to be the way the Roberts Court
views thinJustice Alito’s refusal to uphold equal educational
funding in the Horne English Language Education case also
seems unnecessarily to disregard the interests of racial minority
students. The seventeen years that elapsed between the time the
plaintiffs filed their class action and the time the Supreme Court
remanded without a remedy for yet additional proceedings, has
a disquieting similarity to the long period of time that elapsed
after Brown, when the Supreme Court first acquiesced in Southern evasion of the Brown desegregation mandate but ultimately
refused to desegregate Northern and Western schools.271 Horne
has a disquieting similarity to the Roberts Court’s more recent
refusal to permit voluntary efforts to maintain hard-won integration in the Resegregation Cases.272
The dictum suggestion of Chief Justice Roberts in
Northwest Austin, that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act might
be unconstitutional despite its recent overwhelming reauthorization by Congress, suggests a similar callousness to the interests of racial minorities.273 By its terms, the Voting Rights Act
applies only to jurisdictions that have a history of minority voter
disenfranchisement. And by its terms the Act permits those jurisdictions to make any changes they desire to their voting practices
and procedures, provided they can first demonstrate that they are
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not perpetuating the sorts of past discrimination that caused them
to become covered jurisdictions.274 Rather than acquiesce in the
need for suspect jurisdictions to make that showing, however,
Chief Justice Roberts preferred to subject racial minorities to the
danger of continued voter discrimination. Moreover, he did so
in a political climate involving recent presidential elections that
were rife with allegations of politically-partisan, minority voter
disenfranchisement.275
The aphorism with which Chief Justice Roberts chose to
end his opinion in the Resegregation Cases—“[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race”276—conveys what is perhaps the most disturbing tone of all of the Roberts Court’s post racial discrimination
cases. Chief Justice Roberts appears to suggest that the problem
of racial discrimination in the United States—a problem that has
plagued the nation for hundreds of years, since before the nation’s
inception—is really not such a difficult problem after all. All we
have to do to solve the pesky problem of racial discrimination
is ignore the continuing legacy of past discrimination, and prospectively behave in a colorblind, race neutral manner. Imagine
how insulting it must be for racial minorities to be told that their
problem can be solved in such a simple-minded manner.
There remains an enduring sense of white entitlement,
highlighted by Cheryl Harris in Whiteness As Property,277 pursuant to which whites have traditionally thought it natural to exploit
racial minorities in order to advance white interests. Hillary Jordan’s novel Mudbound278 illustrates this nicely. In the novel,
post-slavery Southern white planters—who commonly cheated
and abused their black workers—sat around vilifying the “nig
gers” for moving North and leaving the planters with no one to
harvest their crops, other than workers who would demand market rates for their labor. The novel was set in the post-World War
II era, but I fear that the attitude of entitlement that it captures is
both less fictitious and less dated than one would hope.
I doubt that the conservative bloc members of the Roberts Court share the racial sentiments expressed by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.279 Still, there is an aspect of Roberts
Court postracial discrimination that Dred Scott renders hauntingly familiar. Dred Scott entailed the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a cong ressional effort to solve a serious racial problem.
As the subsequent Civil War indicates, the Court’s invalidation of
that congressional effort did not work out well. During Recon
struction, the Supreme Court also engaged in efforts to limit or
invalidate congressional efforts to solve our continuing racial
problems. Again, the Supreme Court often chose to limit or
invalidate those efforts. 280 Unfortunately, Roberts Court efforts
to treat racial minorities as if they are no longer victims of dis
crimination, in order to protect the interests of whites instead,
share the historical Court’s propensity to marginalize or overrule congressional policies that have been adopted to help remedy racial discrimination. The Roberts Court Justices certainly
understand this facet of Supreme Court history, but the conservative bloc Justices have chosen to align themselves with those
historical practices nevertheless. Separation of powers considerations aside, it is simply not clear to me why the Roberts Court
thinks it can do a better job of formulating race relations policy
than the politically accountable, representative branches of government, or why the Roberts Court would want to align itself
with the darker strands of Supreme Court racial history. I fear
that the conservative bloc Justices on the Roberts Supreme Court
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may actually consider themselves to be proud heirs of the racial
attitudes that they seem to have inherited from their predecessors.

Conclusion
The view that the Roberts Court seems to have of racial
minorities is disheartening. The Ricci firefighters decision suggests that the Court’s conservative bloc majority favors the interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. Moreover,
the intensity of that favoritism is strong enough to prompt the
Court to circumvent statutory protections that Congress enacted
precisely to prevent such racial favoritism. Because other Roberts Court race decisions exhibit a similar favoritism, the Court’s
preference for whites seems intentional and persistent, rather

than incidental or sporadic. The tone and outcome of the Court’s
decisions are reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions that
were openly hostile to racial minority rights. This suggests that
contemporary racial attitudes may be more firmly rooted in the
past than we would like to admit. The Roberts Court’s race decisions seem premised on the view that we now live in a postracial culture, where discrimination against racial minorities has
largely ceased to exist, and our most serious racial problem is the
problem of minorities discriminating against whites. The election
of Barack Obama notwithstanding, the systemic disadvantages
that minorities continue to suffer relative to whites makes the
assertion of that view seem disingenuous. It is as if the Supreme
Court were simply looking for a novel justification to continue its
time-honored practice of sacrificing racial minority rights for the
benefit of whites.
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27 See id. at 2672, 2681.
28 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
29 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
30 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672-73.
31 See id. at 2673-74.
32 See id. at 2674.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 2674-75.
35 See id. at 2675.
36 See id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion
of Powell, J.)).
37 See id. at 2675-76.
38 See id. at 2676.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 2677.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 2677-78.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 2678 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
47 See id. at 2678-79.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 2679.
50 See id. at 2679-80.
51 See id. at 2680-81.
52 See id. at 2681.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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See id. at 2682 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), and
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-82 (1917)).
56 See id. (citing Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673, and Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
57 See id.
58 See id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
59 See id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995)).
60 See id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1998)
(plurality opinion), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80203 (1973)).
61 See id. at 2682-83 (Alito, J., concurring).
62 See id. at 2683.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id. (quoting Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677).
66 See id.
67 See id. at 2683-84.
68 See id. at 2684.
69 See id. at 2685-87.
70 See id. at 2688.
71 See id. at 2688-89.
72 See id. at 2689.
73 See Spann, supra note 11, at 441-42 (discussing the liberal Supreme Court
voting bloc on the issue of race).
74 See id.
75 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 2690-91.
77 See id. at 2691-92.
78 See id. at 2692-93.
79 See id. at 2693-95.
80 See id. at 2695-96.
81 See id. at 2696-99 (citing, inter alia, Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424,
428-32 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); and
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989)).
82 See id. at 2699.
83 See id. at 2699-2700 (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616, 638, 642 (1987)).
84 See id. at 2700 (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
85 See id. at 2700 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
238 (1995) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 507
(1989))).
86 See id. at 2700-01 (quoting Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 585 (2003)).
87 See id. at 2701 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
Croson, 448 U.S. at 499-500; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637; and Firefighters v.
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 516 (1986)).
88 See id. at 2701-02. This argument is strengthened by Justice Kennedy’s
issuance of an “advisory opinion” that shows the stringency of his “strong basis
in evidence” standard; see also infra text accompanying notes 165-167.
89 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2702-03.
90 See id. at 2703-04.
91 See id. at 2704-06.
92 See id. at 2706-07.
93 See id. at 2707-09.
94 See id. at 2709-10 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)).
95 See id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
96 See id. at 2672, 2673-74.
97 See id. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98 See id. at 2695-96, 2699-2700 (discussing pre-existing Title VII law). The
issue attracted national attention during the July 2009 Senate confirmation
hearings for Justice Sotomayor, when opponents attempted to paint then-Judge
Sotomayor as an unsympathetic judicial activist because of her membership on
the three-judge Second Circuit panel that summarily affirmed the District Court
decision in Ricci. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Senate Likely to Vote on Sotomayor
in August, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2009, at A11 (discussing opposition to panel
ruling in firefighter case); Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Democrats Rally for
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Sotomayor; Backers Dismiss GOP Resistance, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 2009, at
A0; Joseph Williams, Committee Endorses Sotomayor Bid; Latino Groups
Angry at GOP for Opposition, Boston Globe, July 29, 2009, at 6. The panel’s
actions can easily be viewed as the routine application of existing law—albeit
existing law that the Ricci Supreme Court subsequently decided to change in
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.
99 See Girardeau A. Spann, The Law of Affirmative Action: Twenty-Five
Years of Supreme Court Decisions on Race and Remedies 31-43 (2000)
(discussing Title VII cases in which the Supreme Court sought to find the proper
balance between helping women and minorities, and burdening white males).
100 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
101 Cf. id. at 2681 (framing his opinion as resolving “competing expectations
under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions” of Title VII).
102 See id. at 2675-76.
103 See id. at 2696-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Girardeau A. Spann,
Race Against the Court: The Supreme court and Minorities in Contemporary America, 173-75 (1993) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
some of the Supreme Court cases that lead to its enactment).
104 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451-52 (1857).
105 U.S. Const. amend XIV.
106 See Geoffrey Stone et al, Constitutional Law 451-52 (6th ed. 2009)
(discussing post-Civil War shift in federalism balance).
107 190 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883).
108 See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5; see also Stone et al, supra note 106, at
453-56 (discussing Supreme Court dilution and invalidation of Reconstruction
Amendments and legislation).
109 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2699 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
110 See id. at 2701-02. This argument is strengthened by Justice Kennedy’s
issuance of an “advisory opinion” that shows the stringency of his “strong basis
in evidence” standard; see infra text accompanying notes 165-167.
111 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2703-04, 2706-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 2704-06.
113 See id. at 2703-07.
114 See id. at 2705.
115 See id. at 2676.
116 See id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 2687-88 (Alito, J., concurring).
120 See id. at 2688.
121 See id. at 2687-88.
122 See id. at 2684-88.
123 See id. at 2684.
124 Cf. id. at 2690-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 (discussing Justice Alito’s membership in the Supreme Court conservative voting bloc on race).
126 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665 (discussing “rule of three”); see also Ricci v.
DeStefano, 554 F. Supp.2d 142, 145 (2006) (discussing “rule of three”). See id.
at 160-61 (considering the issue of standing and ruling that the petitioners possessed standing to challenge the City’s failure to certify the exam results).
127 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666 (discussing the number of promotion vacan
cies); see also id. at 2664 (noting that the suit was filed by “[c]ertain white and
Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been promoted based on their good
test performance”) (emphasis added).
128 Although nineteen candidates would have been considered for the fifteen
available promotions under the rule of three, only eighteen of those nineteen
candidates chose to sue. One of the disappointed Latino candidates was therefore not a petitioner in the case. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666, 2671 (discussing
the number of candidates and number of petitioners).
129 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-18 (2007); see also id. at 536
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors
of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752-53 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-39
(1976).
130 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568-71.
131 See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-89 (1990).

The Modern American

Endnotes Continued
132

See Simon,, 426 U.S. at 40-46.
See EPA, 549 U.S. at 517-18, 525-26 (finding standing despite redressability
problems); cf. id. at 536; 540-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Massachusetts lacked standing because of redressability problems).
134 See Girardeau A Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1422,
1426 n.1 (1995) (quoting comments concerning disarray of standing doctrine).
135 This argument is developed more fully in id.
136 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984); see also Spann, supra note 134, at 1456 (discussing Allen v. Wright).
137 422 U.S. 490, 502-08 (1975); see also Spann, supra note 134, at 1455-56
(discussing Warth v. Seldin).
138 See Spann, supra note 134, at 1457-58 (discussing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 431
U.S. 95, 97-104 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-73 (1976); O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490-93 (1974); Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514,
519-23 (1974)).
139 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993); see also Spann, supra note 134, at 1426-27;
1446-52 (discussing Northeastern Florida).
140 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 210-12 (1995) (granting standing to white plaintiff).
141 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995) (granting standing
to whites who challenged redistricting of voter district in which they resided,
where challenged redistricting increased minority voting strength); cf. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (permitting white challenge to redistricting plan that
increased minority voting strength without discussing issue of standing); but see
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-47 (1995) (denying standing to whites
who challenged redistricting of voting district in which they did not reside).
142 See e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-97 (1968) (discussing Article III
restriction on advisory opinions); Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516
(2007).
143 See Ricci v. DeStefano 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (noting that no
complaint was filed in such a hypothetical suit, no discovery was conducted
concerning job-relatedness or the existence of less discriminatory alternatives,
no subsidiary legal issues were identified or briefed, and of course, no trial was
conducted).
144 See id. at 2677 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
145 See id. at 2681.
146 See id. at 2667.
147 See id. at 2667-68.
148 See id. at 2668-69.
149 See id. at 2669.
150 See id. at 2670.
151 See id. at 2702-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 See id. at 2679-81.
153 See id. at 2705 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154 Cf. id. at 2683-88 (Alito, J., concurring) (highlighting the factual disputes
concerning the City’s motive that should have precluded summary judgment for
the City).
155 See id. at 2680.
156 See id. at 2670-71.
157 See id. at 2705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158 See id. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the procedures speci
fied in the union contract had been used for two decades).
159 See id. at 2683-88 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing racial politics).
160 See id. at 2702-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2703 n.9 (noting
that the majority’s failure to remand deprived the City of the opportunity to raise
a statutory defense that was available for good faith compliance with a written
interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
161 See id. at 2681.
162 See id. at 2698-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60).
163 See id. at 2675-76 (borrowing the “strong basis in evidence” standard from
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence).
164 After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a congressionally
enacted broadcast affirmative action plan in Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497
U.S. 547 (1990), the Court did not uphold the constitutionality of another
racial affirmative action plan until it’s 2003 decision upholding the University
of Michigan Law School plan in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
However, that same day, the Court invalidated the University of Michigan’s
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undergraduate affirmative plan in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003),
even though the two plans are difficult to distinguish. See, e.g., Girardeau A.
Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 Const. Comment. 221, 227-29, 242-49
(2004) (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs, and the difficulty distinguishing between Grutter and Gratz); Spann, supra note 99, at 159-63 (discussing
Supreme Court outcomes and voting blocs in racial affirmative action cases).
165 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
166 See id.; see also id. at 2681 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s “advisory opinion” was explicitly articulated in terms of interest balancing. Justice Kennedy
states: “Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to resolve competing
expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. If,
after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then in
light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid disparateimpact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the
results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability.”).
167 See id. at 2701-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s fear of impeding voluntary
compliance).
168 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that official
segregation did not stamp blacks with a badge of inferiority unless blacks chose
to interpret segregation in that manner).
169 See, e.g., Robert Goldman & Stephen Papson, Nike Culture: the Sign of
the Swoosh 113-17 (Sage Publications) (1998) (discussing Nike’s use of Tiger
Woods as a post-racial, multicultural icon).
170 See Leonard Pitts, It’s Not the End of Race—Just a Big Step Forward,
Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 18, 2009, at A19 (discussing whether black politicians,
including Michael Steele, are “post-racial”).
171 See sources cited supra note 1 (suggesting that Obama’s election as president
indicates shift to postracial culture).
172 See Cheryl W. Thompson, et al., Gates, Police Officer Share Beers and His
tories with President, Wash. Post, July 31, 2009, at A3 (discussing Gates arrest
by Cambridge police officer).
173 Ann Gerhart, Alleged Prejudice Starts Probe at Club: Pa. Organization
Revoked Swim Contract for Day Camp that Included Minorities, Wash. Post,
July 11, 2009, at A2 (discussing exclusion of minority children from swim
club).
174 See DeNeed L. Brown, Through the Past, Darkly: The Legacy of Colorism
Reflects Wounds of Racism that Are More than Skin-Deep, Wash. Post, July 12,
2009, at E1 (discussing Michael Jackson’s transformed skin color).
175 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2689-91 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
176 See id.
177 See id. at 2673-77, 2681.
178 See id. at 2683-87 (Alito, J., concurring).
179 See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 How. L.J. 611, 645-52
(2007) [hereinafter Affirmative Inaction] (noting the author’s inversion arguments in the context of criticizing the Supreme Court’s hostility to affirmative
action, , and the author’s efforts to deconstruct the very distinction between
affirmative action and discrimination); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative
Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 63-76 (1995).
180 See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 709,
722-29 (2005) [hereinafter Constitutionlization] (describing baseline shifting as
a strategic analytical technique).
181 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2681 (depicting white firefighters as victims, and minority firefighters as perpetrators of discrimination).
182 See Constitutionalization, supra note 180, at 721-23 (discussing Realist
insight that there is no natural baseline).
183 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2681 (discussing the need to avoid disparate-treatment discrimination, and to avoid burden on high scoring firefighters).
184 See id. at 2689-90, 2696-700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the need
to avoid disparate-impact discrimination).
185 See id. at 2696-99 (discussing Title VII’s goal of preventing disparate-impact
discrimination).
186 See id. at 2673-77, 2681.
187 See sources cited supra note 2 (citing commentators who are skeptical of the
postracial claim).

49

Endnotes Continued
188

See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the striking racial disparities that continue to exist in
distribution of societal resources).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 172-174 (discussing the contemporary
significance of race).
190 See sources cited supra note 1 (citing commentators who suggest that contemporary culture is now postracial).
191 See Kelefa Sanneh, Comment: Discriminating Tastes, The New Yorker, Aug
10 & 17, 2009, at 21.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
195 This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal
discrimination, as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination,
was articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-78 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality). Led
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority
of the full Supreme Court. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-25
(2003) (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (rejecting societal discrimination);
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 610-14 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989)
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
647-53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See generally Spann, supra note 99, at
168-69 (discussing general societal discrimination).
196 See Spann, Affirmative Inaction, supra note 179, at 636-39 (criticizing the
societal discrimination rule).
197 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 299-304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dis
cussing the striking racial disparities that continue to exist in distribution of
societal resources).
198 See Gates, supra note 2, at 15-23 (2009) (discussing Wilson’s rejection of the
postracial claim).
199 See Thompson, supra note 1, at A3 (discussing Darren Hutchinson’s concept
of “racial exhaustion”).
200 See Thompson et al., supra note 172, at A3 (citing discussions of Gates’
arrest).
201 See Stone et al., supra note 106, at lxxi (discussing the confirmation of
Chief Justice Roberts).
202 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
203 See id. at 2508-11, 2513-17.
204 See id. at 2513 (declining to address the constitutional question).
205 See id. at 2511-13 (suggesting that Section 5 would now be unconstitu
tional). Justice Thomas expressed similar sentiments, stating that “[t]he Court
quite properly alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority and may not be constitutional.” See id. at
2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
206 See David S. Broder, For Obama, Court Cases That Matter, Wash. Post,
July 2, 2009, at A19 (arguing that Northwest Austin and Ricci reflect the
Supreme Court view “that racial discrimination is no longer as big a problem as
we thought”).
207 See Adam Cohen, The Supreme Court’s Hostility to the Voting Rights Act,
N.Y. Times, May 13, 2009, at A30 (discussing congressional vote, hearings and
legislative record).
208 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696-99 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
209 See Northwest Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-13 (suggesting that Section 5 would
now be unconstitutional); see also id. at 2519, 2526-27 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Justice Thomas
expressed similar sentiments and would have declared Section 5 to be unconstitutional in Northwest Austin itself, stating that “[t]he Court quite properly
alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority and may not be constitutional.”); see also E.J. Dionne,
Jr., Courtly Politics: A Compromise Sustains the Voting Rights Act, Wash. Post,
June, 25, 2009, at A19 (commenting on threatened future invalidation of Voting
Rights Act).
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210

See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676, 2681 (expressly raising and reserving the question of Title VII constitutionality).
211 See Spann, supra note 99, at 180-89 (discussing the redistricting cases that
the Supreme Court decided after 1990 census); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 956-57 (1996) (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor, J.) (citing a series of
Supreme Court redistricting cases decided “in the wake of 1990 census”).
212 See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 569-75 (1997) (discussing a redistricting plan that was modified after preclearance denial and subsequent negotiations with Justice Department); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
905-10 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-39 (1993).
213 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
214 See id. at 1238-40 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.).
215 See id. at 1241-1246 (rejecting the vote dilution protections for crossover
districts).
216 See id. at 1250 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing perverse incentives).
217 See id. at 1251 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218 See id. at 1243.
219 See id. at 1245, 1247-49.
220 See id. at 1249 (suggesting that racism in voting was waning); but see id.
(suggesting that much still remains to be done).
221 Cf. id. at 1255 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
223 See id. at 1942-43 (holding that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
224 See id. at 1943-44.
225 See id. at 1944-45.
226 See id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(1950)).
227 See id. at 1951.
228 See id. at 1948-49, 1952.
229 See Melinda Hanson, Term in Review: Civil Cases, 78 U.S.L.W. 3025, 302527 (July 21, 2009) (discussing the tension between Iqbal and notice pleadings).
230 See, e.g., Editorial, Illegal, and Pointless, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2009, at 22
(discussing possible involvement of high level government officials in torture
of terrorist suspects); Doyle McManus, Tortuous Road to the Truth, L.A. Times,
July 19, 2009, at A31; Michael Muskal, What and Why Behind CIA Counterterror Issue, Chi. Trib., July 26, 2009, at 30.
231 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009).
232 See id. at 2588-89.
233 See id. at 2590-92.
234 See id. at 2593-95 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) standards).
235 See id. at 2595-2600 (discussing the need for flexibility, and deemphasizing
the importance of complying with lower court funding orders).
236 See id. at 2600-2606.
237 See id. at 2607-08, 2613-15, 2621-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 See id. at 2631 (expressing concern for Spanish-speaking students).
239 See, e.g., Thomas D. Edmondson & Melinda Hanson, High Court Gives
Arizona Another Crack At Doffing Language Program Injunction, 77 U.S.L.W.
1825 (June 30, 2009) (discussing the finality problem).
240 See State English Language Learners’ Program Triggers Debate on Funding,
Remedial Orders, 77 U.S.L.W. (April, 28, 2009).
241 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
242 See id. at 709-10 .
243 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting the
separate-but-equal doctrine and declaring official school segregation to be
unconstitutional); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955) (tempering the effect of Brown by declining to order immediate school
desegregation and instead requiring desegregation “with all deliberate speed”).
244 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 709-18.
245 See id. at 710-11, 715-18.
246 See id. at 711, 722-25.
247 See id. at 745-48 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (invoking Brown).
248 See id. at 741-48 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (ignoring motive).
249 Id. at 748.
250 See id. at 803-04, 823-30, 858-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown
and other precedents permitted plans).
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See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. Miami L.
Rev. 431 (2009) (noting the author’s vigorous criticisms of the Resegregation Cases arguing that the Supreme Court is serving as the judicial arm of
the “movement conservative” effort to dismantle the New Deal welfare state);
Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. Louisville L. Rev. 565 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court is constitutionalizing school segregation).
252 See District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2319-23 (2009) (denying post-conviction access to DNA testing).
253 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing the European discovery of the land now constituting the United States, the conquest of
indigenous Indian inhabitants, and divesting Indians of title to that land).
254 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
255 See id. at 407 (holding that blacks could not be citizens within the meaning
of the United States Constitution for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as
interfering with property rights of slave owners).
256 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting citizenship to blacks); cf. id. amend.
XIII (abolishing slavery).
257 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public
accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875 and imposing “state
action” restriction on congressional antidiscrimination legislation); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1876) (refusing to apply criminal
provisions of Enforcement Act of 1870 to Ku Klux Klan lynching of black
freedmen); see also Stone et al., supra note 106, at 453-56 (describing the
Supreme Court’s restrictions on Reconstruction legislation).
258 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of sepa
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